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Fukushima's Shadow
Lincoln L. Davies*
Alexis Jones**

ABSTRACT

The March 11, 2011 tragedy at the Fukushima Daiichi
power station in Japan immediately etched its place in history
as arguably the most noteworthy of the three nuclear energy
disasters to date. This Article surveys the response to
Fukushima both in Japan and worldwide. It observes that
rather than stopping what many thought was a burgeoning
"nuclear renaissance," the global policy reaction postFukushima was more varied. Using the examples of Germany,
the United States, and China, the Article examines the three
general approaches to nuclear energy that nations have followed
since Fukushima: abandonment, status quo, and expansion.
The Article then uses these different responses to highlight core
tensions in energy policy, namely, between markets and
planning, between resilience and path dependence, and in
values. The Article concludes by summarizing Fukushima's
likely impact on nuclear power going forward, noting the
inherent complexity in energy and energy law and policy
systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"That place is finished. It's only fit for ghosts."' That is how one
former resident of Japan's Fukushima Prefecture now describes the

area that, on March 11, 2011, suffered the triple devastation of a 9.0
earthquake, its ensuing tsunami, and, then, a triple meltdown of the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. 2 Indeed, the meltdown at
Fukushima undeniably changed the place-so much so that, in an
effort to assure the public of the government's rehabilitation efforts,
national politicians in Japan, including the Prime Minister, have
taken to television, drinking water from the site and eating peaches
3
grown in the region, to advertise the area's safety.

1.
Hannah Beech, The World's Most Dangerous Room, TIME (Aug. 21, 2014),
http://time.com/worlds-most-dangerous-room/ [http://perma.cedQMV6-KYK2] (archived
Sept. 6, 2015).
2.
For more details on the disaster itself, see, for example, INST. FOR
NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS, SPECIAL REPORT ON THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AT THE

2011),
(Nov.
STATION
POWER
NUCLEAR
DAIICHI
FUKUSHIMA
http://www.nei.org/corporatesite/media/ffilefolder/11005_SpecialReporton.Fukushim
aDaiichiMASTER110811l.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4U9-9TMK] (archived Sept. 6,
2015); FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEP. INVESTIGATION COMM'N, THE OFFICIAL
REPORT OF THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION
COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL DIET OF JAPAN (2012) [hereinafter INVESTIGATION
[https://perma.cc/N4DHREPORT], https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiicreport.pdf
27Q2] (archived Sept. 6, 2015); THE SASAKAWA PEACE FOUND., THE FUKUSHIMA
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT AND CRISI' MANAGEMENT: LESSONS FOR JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE
http://www.spf.org/jpus/img/
2012),
(Sept.
COOPERATION
investigation/book fukushima.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TRU-X95X] (archived Sept. 6,
2014); WORLD NUCLEAR Ass'N, Fukushima Accident (Sept. 6, 2015, 6:17 PM), http://
www.world-nuclear.orglinfo/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-accident/
[http://perma.cc/B2M9-3Q5J] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
Id.; Robert Mackey & Ravi Somaiya, JapaneseOfficial Drinks Water from
3.
Fukushima Reactor Buildings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2011), http://thelede.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/11/01/japanese-official-drinks-water-from-fukushima-reactorbuildings/ [http://perma.cc/5LQ6-6H9V] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
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The fateful events of March 11 began simply enough. A massive
earthquake in the middle of the Pacific Ocean unleashed an equally
enormous tsunami that quickly reached Japan's coastline. 4 The
earthquake itself automatically disabled Fukushima Daiichi's
reactors, just as they were designed to do. But when the tsunami's
waves struck, they engulfed the facility's backup diesel generators,
which had been located in the basement and on the ground floor.5
Then all havoc ensued. Unable to restore power to the facility-and
thus to keep coolant water flowing-plant operators worked bravely
but in vain to stop what quickly became unavoidable: a meltdown of
three of the facility's reactors and a fire in Building 4, which housed
spent fuel rods.6 Much in contrast to the disaster's beginnings, its
aftermath was, and continues to be, vastly complex. Japan
established exclusion zones around the facility, evacuated scores of
residents, stopped producing electricity using nuclear technology
nationwide (until only recently), and eventually began cleaning up
the site, a process that is expected to take decades. 7 As one worker
put it at the time, "[i]f we're in hell now all we can do is to crawl up
towards heaven."8
Of course, the disaster unleashed on Fukushima-an area that
before the devastation was described as "picture-postcard,"9 "a placid
landscape of fishing villages, rice paddies and dairy farms,"1 0 "a place
with the 'feel of Maine: organic farms, pine forests, coastal towns
where the air is spiked with sea salt""'-is not limited to Japan
alone. In the weeks and months after the meltdowns, calls that the
disaster would unalterably shift the way energy is produced on this
planet were not uncommon. As 2011 began, many eyed nuclear power

See supranote 2.
4.
5.
Howard Chua-Eoan, How to Stop a Nuclear Meltdown, TIME (Mar. 12,
2011), http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,2058615,00.html [http://perma.cc/
K9A2-E5K3] (archived Oct. 16, 2015); Evan Osnos, The Fallout: Seven Months Later:
Japan's Nuclear Predicament, NEW YORKER, Oct. 17, 2011, at 46, http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/17/the-fallout
[http://perma.cc/EUD7-Q4NH]
(archived Oct. 16, 2015).
O.M., Piecing Together Fukushima, EcONOMIST (May 5, 2011, 8:53 AM),
6.
http://www.economist.comlblogs/babbage/2011/05/japans-nuclear-disaster [http://perma.
ccIY2MM-XK2P] (archived Oct. 16, 2015).
See infra Part II.
7.
8.
Letters from Fukushima: Tepco Worker Emails, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2011,
8:21 PM), http://tinyurl.com/5skvh2l [http://perma.cclE4FR-U3A6] (archived Oct. 16,
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9.
David McNeill, Fukushima No. 1's Scary Shadow: Bucolic Farm Belt Now
No-Go Zone of Radioactivity, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 31, 2011, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
text/nn20110331fl.html [http://perma.cc/LV2T-HU5X] (archived Sept. 13, 2015).
Beech, supranote 1.
10.
11.
Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and
Energy Law, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1937, 1946 (quoting Evan Osnos, The Fallout:Letter
from Fukushima- Seven Months Later: Japan's Nuclear Predicament, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 17, 2011, at 46, 55).
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as a key tool to mitigate climate change, with some saying its
importance for this purpose would lead to a "nuclear renaissance." 12
By March 11, however, all that changed. As the scope of destruction
at Fukushima Daiichi became clear, many more said the tragedy
would be the death knell for the nuclear industry. 13
This Article surveys the impact that the disaster in Japan has
had on nuclear power and energy policy across the globeFukushima's "shadow." The core point is that while common sense
might predict that a disaster as devastating as Fukushima would
fundamentally alter the global energy landscape, in fact the opposite
is true. Rather than halting the growth of nuclear power, the paths
that nations have chosen diverge. Post-Fukushima, a few nations
decided to abandon nuclear energy, but many others have stayed the
course, and some are expanding their investments in this resource.
Thus, from an energy policy perspective, the story of Fukushima's
aftermath is more complex and nuanced than might be expected.
As such, Fukushima's aftermath also provides insight into global
energy policy. Specifically, the disaster at Fukushima-and countries'
reactions to it-exposes three key tensions that undergird energy
policy worldwide: those between markets and planning, between path
dependence and resilience, and in energy values. These tensions in
energy policy, in turn, highlight why energy decision making is so
difficult. Energy systems form the basis of modern life, from economic
security to industrial expansion. At the same time, modifying how
energy is produced, transported, and used is a key target for
constituents interested in protecting the basic ecological systems on
which life relies. There are thus strong reasons for governments to
intervene in how energy markets function, depending on what aimor aims-they want to promote. Yet, the sheer massiveness of the
energy system makes planning and change difficult. As a result, those

12.
E.g., John F. Ahearne, Prospects for Nuclear Energy, 33 ENERGY EcoN.
572, 573 (2011); Alexander Glaser, After Fukushima: Preparingfor a More Uncertain
Future of Nuclear Power, 24 ELECTRICITY J. 27, 27 (July 2011); Shinzo Saito, Role of
Nuclear Energy to a Future Society of Shortage of Energy Resources and Global
Warming, 398 J. NUCLEAR MATERIALS 1, 6 (2010).
13.
Following the meltdowns, for instance, Christopher Flavin, President of
Worldwatch, proclaimed that "the Fukushima disaster is an historic-if not fatalsetback" for the nuclear industry. The End of Nuclear, WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE,
http://www.worldwatch.org/end-nuclear, (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) [http://perma.cc/
WDR5-GZD8] (archived Sept. 6, 2015). This was a common sentiment, as the media
and other observers suggested that the nuclear industry might well wilt given the risk
that the Fukushima disaster made so clear. See, e.g., Eben Harrell, Fukushima The
End of the Nuclear Renaissance?, TIME (Sept. 4, 2011), http://science.time.com/
2011/03/14/fukushima-the-end-of-the-nuclear-renaissance/ [http://perma.cc/BX8G-LCR7]
(archived Sept. 6, 2015); Per Lekander et. al., Can Nuclear Power Survive Fukushima?,
UBS (Apr. 4, 2011), http://suomenkuvalehti.filwp-content/uploads/sk/files/pdf-liitteet
118095_QSeries-Nuclear%2OPower.pdf [http://perma.cc/EX78-BYNJ] (archived Sept. 6,
2015).
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who want to foment change may try to seize on a disaster like
Fukushima as a key opportunity, but the fact that even great
disasters do not always yield hard turns in energy policy should not
be surprising. The energy system is incredibly complex, and so too are
the legal and policy systems that govern it, as often must be the case.
When one system's complexity increases, the complexity of those
around it typically must as well in order to interface.1 4 The variety in
global responses to Fukushima is yet one more manifestation of this.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II describes the response
in Japan to the Fukushima disaster since March 11, 2011. Focusing
on the examples of Germany, the United States, and China, Part III
summarizes three categories of global reaction that followed in
nuclear policy: abandonment, status quo, and expansion. Part IV then
uses the lens of Fukushima to briefly explore the three core tensions
in energy policy. Part V concludes.

II. THE CLOUD: THE FUKUSHIMA
DISASTER AND ITS AFTERMATH IN JAPAN

Time will tell, but odds are good that the triple meltdown at
Fukushima Daiichi may eventually assume the place of the most
significant nuclear energy disaster in history, eclipsing even
Chernobyl. This is because, quite simply, the disaster is not yet over.
"[T]he nightmare continues."15
In the four years since the tsunami struck, the scope of the havoc
that Fukushima's failure unleashed on Japan has not diminished.
Rather, as more study is done, and as efforts to clean up the region
continue, the full impact of the disaster has continued to be revealed.
In many ways, then, the cleanup efforts are much like a slow-motion
autopsy-the full scope of the disaster's effects are discovered only
iteratively, over a long period of time.
Thankfully, scientists believe that the meltdowns will not have
any lasting health effects for the populace at large, with no known
16
"deaths or cases of radiation sickness from the nuclear accident,"
7
even as 20,000 died from the tsunami itself.1 A 2013 UN report thus

E.g., JOSEPH A. TAINTER, THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES 119
14.
(1988).
15.
Kazuaki Nagata, Fukushima No. 1's Never Ending Battle with Radioactive
Water, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 11, 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/11/
[http://
nationallfukushima-1s-never-ending-battle-radioactive-water/#.VSIOOqZYgRY
perma.cc/6XLW-BBJW] (archived Sept. 13, 2015).
16.
WORLD NUCLEAR ASS'N, supra note 2.
17.
Hirok Tabuchi, An Anniversary of 'HeartbreakingGrief' in Japan, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/worldlasia/a-year-later-
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concluded, "[riadiation exposure following the nuclear accident at
Fukushima Daiichi did not cause any immediate health effects" and
is "unlikely" to result in "any health effects in the future among the
general public and the vast majority of workers."' 8 Other experts
agree. A "sweeping" $958 million public health survey being
conducted by Fukushima Medical University determined that almost
all evacuees from the disaster received very low radiation dosesmaxing out at 25 millisieverts (mSv), "well below the 100-mSv
exposure that has been linked to an increased risk of cancer."' 9
Likewise, the World Health Organization has observed that "no
observable increases in cancer above natural variation in baseline
rates are anticipated" from Fukushima. 20
That is the good news. The other side of the story is that
Fukushima Daiichi's detrimental effects are both far-reaching and
severe. The meltdowns forced an estimated 150,000 people to
evacuate their homes to avoid radiation, and today nearly 120,000
remain displaced because of the disaster. 21 The government has
effects-of-j apans-disaster-are-still-unfolding.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/942G-YNPQ]
(archived Sept. 6, 2015).
18.
Press Release, Information Service, No Immediate Health Risks from
Fukushima Nuclear Accident Says UN Expert Science Panel, U.N. Press Release
UNIS/INF/475
(May 31,
2013), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/
unis/en/pressrels/2013/unisinf475.html [http://perma.cc/3YWX-PUTL] (archived Sept.
6, 2015).
19.
Geoff Brumfiel & Ichiko Fuyuno, Japan's Nuclear Crisis: Fukushima's
Legacy of Fear, NATURE (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news/japan-s-nuclearcrisis-fukushima-s-legacy-of-fear-1.10183 [http://perma.cc/C56X-EFM2] (archived Sept.
6, 2015); Geoff Brumfiel, Fukushima Fallout of Fear, NATURE (Jan. 16, 2013),
http://www.nature.com/news/fukushima-fallout-of-fear-1.12194 [http://perma.cclWfR6C8BA9] (archived Sept. 6, 2015). The survey seeks to monitor the health of 2 million
people from the Fukushima region for 30 years.
20.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT FROM THE NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT AFTER THE 2011 GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI BASED ON A

PRELIMINARY DOSE ESTIMATION (2013), available at http://apps.who.int/irislbitstream/
10665/78218/1/9789241505130_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/553J-QLP2] (archived Sept. 6,
2015).
21.
INVESTIGATION REPORT, supra note 2; see also Jiji, More Fukushima
Evacuees are Deciding to Stay Away for Good, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 4, 2015,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/04/national/more-fukushima-evacuees-aredeciding-to-stay-away-for-good/#.VfXfrbEo71U [http://perma.cc/336Z-3TCY] (archived
Sept. 13, 2015); Beech, supranote 1 ("Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant-ground
zero of the worst atomic meltdown since Chernobyl."); Julie Makinen, After 4 Years,
Fukushima Cleanup Remains Daunting, Vast, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://
www.latimes.com/worldlasialla-fg-fukushima-nuclear-cleanup-2015031 1-story.html
[http://perma.cc/NM24-5QSN] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (stating that 20,000 citizens of
Minamisoma remain evacuated); Rick Noack, 3 Ways the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster
is Still Having an Impact Today, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/12/3-ways-the-fukushima-nucleardisaster-is-still-having-an-impact-today/ [https://perma.cc/PB9B-247S] (archived Sept.
6, 2015) (stating that the catastrophe caused 300,000 people to have to evacuate);
Megan Rowling, Japan Makes a Start on Sharing Lessons From Nuclear Crisis,
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/27/us-japan-disaster-
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drawn a twenty-kilometer (12.4 mile) exclusion zone around the
power station and continues to limit entry to areas farther outside
that. 22 Many of these evacuees "now subsist in prefab units" that are
"more evocative of a third-world disaster zone than the world's third
largest economy." 23 The evacuation has both split families and caused
measurable mental anguish for the displaced. 24 According to one
assessment, roughly 15 percent of evacuated adults "showed signs of
extreme stress, five times the normal rate, and one in five showed
signs of mental trauma-a rate similar to that of the first responders
to the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States." 25
Meanwhile, evacuated children "showed stress levels about double
the Japanese average," a result perhaps hardly surprising given that
nuclear refugees in Japan continue to receive regular thyroid
examinations and health checks, and some have decided to wear
dosimeters on a daily basis. 26
The disaster also has imposed significant economic impacts. The
additional fuel costs that Japan now pays because it, until recently,
shut down its entire nuclear fleet are estimated at $28.82 billion per
year, while residential electricity prices have increased almost 20
percent and industrial rates 30 percent. 27 The net effect is that in
nuclear-idUSKBNOMN03M20150327 [http://perma.cc/B644-EWEY] (archived Sept. 6,
2015) ("Of the 160,000 people who left their homes after the nuclear accident, around
120,000 are still classified as evacuees.").
Fukushima Accident, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.world22.
nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident/ (last visited
Oct. 2015).
BEECH, supra note 1
23.
See id. ("Stress, both physical and mental, has led to a rise in suicides.");
24.
see also Martin Fackler, Forced to Flee Radiation, Fearful Japanese Villagers Are
Reluctant to Return, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/28/
worldlasialforced-to-flee-radiation-fearful-japanese-villagers-are-reluctant-to-return.html
[http://perma.cclSL2V-NKCC] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (indicating that many evacuees
are forced to live in barracks-like housing); Abigail Haworth, After Fukushima
Familieson the Edge of Meltdown, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2013/feb/24/divorce-after-fukushima-nuclear-disaster [http://perma.cc/
YJ63-PMX5] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) ("Marital discord has become so widespread that
the phenomenon of couples breaking up has a name: genpatsu rikon or 'atomic
divorce."'); Justin McCurry, Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: Three Years On 120,000
Evacuees Remain Uprooted, GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/sep/10/fukushima-nuclear-disaster-japan-three-years-families-uprooted [http:
//perma.cc/JP8R-KMMH] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (stating that close-knit families are
forced to live separately and are in "nuclear limbo").
Brumfiel, supra note 19.
25.
Id.; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 20 (indicating that
26.
dosimeters were made available to all workers); Justin McCurry, Fukushima's
Children at Centre of Debate Over Rates of Thyroid Cancer, GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/09/fukushima-children-debate-thyroidcancer-japan-disaster-nuclear-radiation [http://perma.cclAA5J-T34P] (archived Sept. 6,
2015) (stating that fears of radiation negatively impact children's health).
Agence France-Presse, Why is Nuclear Power Important for Japan?,
27.
INDUSTRY WEEK (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.industryweek.com/energy/why-nuclearpower-important-japan; Japan Continues to Count Cost of Idle Reactors, WORLD
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fiscal year 2013, Japan depended on imported fossil fuels for 88
percent of its electricity production, as opposed to only 62 percent in
the year before Fukushima. 28
The cost of cleanup is even greater. The Japanese government
has embarked on an ambitious effort to remediate radiation
contamination in the areas outside the Daiichi plant-a task that
describes.
nor "Sisyphean" adequately
neither "Herculean"
Throughout the region, radiated leaves, straw, dirt, and other
detritus now pile up in giant double-lined plastic bags as big as hot
tubs waiting for collection and disposal. Altogether, decontamination
is proceeding in 105 cities, towns, and villages and already has cost
more than $15 billion, amassing 5.5 million bar-coded bags of
radioactive waste totaling 157,420 tons. 29 The government aims to
have the 12,000 workers performing this task complete it by 2017 and
has promised to store the waste outside Fukushima. 30 So far,
however, no such site has been located, and the interim plan is to put
what is expected to be sixteen to twenty-two million bags of waste in
a 6.2-square-mile specialized landfill-five times the size of Central
31
Park-not far from the Daiichi plant.

Japan also faces expenses beyond the immediate costs of
cleanup. Fishing off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture remains
suspended, 32 and other agricultural products from the region
continue to be received skeptically, despite careful testing by the
Japanese government. 33 Localities that host nuclear power plants are
NUCLEAR NEWS (June 17, 2014), http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/np-japan[http://perma.cc/8SPX-B96P]
continues-to-count-cost-of-idled-reactors-1706144.html
(archived Sept. 6, 2015).
Id.
28.
29.
See Makinen, supra note 21; Yomiyuri Shimbun, Radioactive Waste Left in
Limbo; Local Authorities Avoid FilingPaperwork For 3,600 Tons, JAPAN NEWS (Apr. 3,
2015), http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002031113; Prime Minister Vows New
5- Year Fukushima Recovery Plan, GREENWIRE (Mar. 10, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/
(archived
[http://perma.cc/NL4Z-QW5C]
greenwire/2015/03/10/stories/1060014755
Sept. 6, 2015) ("Japan has spent more than $15 billion on a project to lower radiation in
towns near the plant.").
Makinen, supra note 21.
30.
Id.
31.
32.
Julie Makinen, 4 Years After Fukushirma, Japan Considers Restarting
Nuclear Facilities, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/worldlasialla-fg(archived
[http://perma.cc/SD5E-LS3D]
japan-nuclear-20150330-story.html#page=1
Sept. 6, 2015). Limited trial fishing (involving limited offshore fishing and inspections
of certain species before sell) resumed in August 2012. See JAPAN MINISTRY OF
AGRICULTURE,

FORESTRY

AND

FISHERIES,

RESULTS

OF

THE

MONITORING

ON

RADIOACTIVITY LEVEL IN FISHERIES PRODUCTS (last updated Jul. 31, 2015),
http://www.jfa.maff.go.jp/e/inspection/ [http://perma.cclM6JN-7CLK (archived Sept. 6,
2015).
33.
See, e.g., After Meltdown, Consumer Won't Drink Sake From Fukushima,
GREENWIRE (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/2015/01/15/stories/
1060011729 [http://perma.ccl3F2P-ZL6F] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (stating that
consumers are concerned that radiation-tainted air made it into rice fields and water
supplies); Fukushima Rice Passes Radiation Tests, GREENWIRE (Jan. 5, 2015),
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losing substantial tax revenue because almost none of these facilities
are running. 34 And the government has announced a $6.8 billion plan
to build 440 seawalls-a so-called "Great Wall of Japan"-to protect
6
in
the
future.
from
vulnerabilities
facilities
nuclear
Decommissioning the Daiichi plant itself is supposed to cost $8.5
billion, though the Tokyo Electric Power Company ("TEPCO") has
said it will need another $8.7 billion over the next decade to cover
"unanticipated" costs.

36

What's more, a recent audit estimated that

TEPCO wasted more than a third of the $1.6 billion it spent on
cleanup following the meltdowns.37
On the Daiichi site, decontamination and decommissioning are
expected to take thirty to forty years to complete. 38 Nearly 7,000
workers storm the property each day to do the work, 39 and their
biggest battle is the continually growing stock of radiated water.
Because Daiichi sits next to the ocean, rain and groundwater flowing
downhill to the sea constantly flood the damaged reactor buildings,
producing 300 tons-or 80,000 gallons-of radiated water each day. 40
To deal with this wastewater, TEPCO is "endlessly" building giant
storage tanks-one every two-and-a-half days-to contain the
contamination.4 1 This expansive farm of tanks, some of which have

http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060011086/search?keyword=Fukushima+Ric
e+Passes+Radiation+Tests [http://perma.cc/N5DR-KM7K] (archived Sept. 6, 2015)
(noting that all rice grown in the area of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant passed
government radiation testing); Reiji Yoshida, Radiation Checks Clear Most Food Items,
JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/03/07/nationall
radiation-checks-clear-most-food-items/#.VSmRuqZYgRY [http://perma.cc/53Z9-MCZW]
(archived Sept. 13, 2015).
See Martin Fackler & Norimitsu Onishi, In Japan, a Culture That
34.
2011),
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
30,
Nuclear
Dependency,
Promotes
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/world/asia/31japan.html
[http://perma.cc/V7EBUWMG] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (stating that the No. 3 reactor promised "$690 million
in property tax revenues spread over more than 15 years" once it became operational in
2012).
Nick Cunningham, The $6.8 Billion Great Wall of Japan: Fukushima
35.
Cleanup Takes on Epic Proportion, TIME (Mar. 24, 2015), http://time.com/3757069/
japan-fukushima-cleanup/ [http://perma.cc/9856-2EZK] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
Makinen, supra note 32.
36.
37.
Mari Yamaguchi, Japan Audit: Millions of Dollars Wasted in Fukushima
Cleanup, AP: THEBIGSTORY (Mar. 24, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/articlel
75dd3b31041949b7bbd4del4a2d5b287/japan-audit-millions-dollars-wasted-fukushima':leanup [http://perma.cclYM8X-R6RZ] (archived Sept. 27, 2015).
38.
See Cunningham, supra note 35 (indicating that it could take up to forty
years to complete the work).
39.
Makinen, supra note 32.
40.
Nagata, supra note 15; see also Julie Makinen, Inspectors Urge Japan to
Dump Water From Fukushima Plant Into Ocean, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/worldlasialla-fg-iaea-japan-water-fukushima-plant-20150217story.html [http://perma.cc/JYB6-U399] (archived Sept. 6, 2015). By comparison,
workers at Three Mile Island had just over 2 million gallons of total wastewater to deal
with.
Beech, supra note 1; Nagata, supra note 15.
41.
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leaked, now numbers over 1,300, with more than 800,000 tons of
water inside. 42 Moreover, the techniques being used to address
problems on the site is the stuff of science fiction. To slow the buildup
of contaminated water, TEPCO plans to surround the reactor
buildings with a one-and-a-half-kilometer-long frozen wall of soil,
which itself will have a barrier of forty-one wells, or "subdrain pits,"
to siphon off incoming groundwater. 4 3 And while it has been able to
remove fuel rods from one of the four damaged reactor buildings on
site,44 TEPCO also plans to use a shape-changing robot to help see
inside the other three. 45 Edwin Lyman, a nuclear expert with the
Union of Concerned Scientists, thus deadpanned that the
decommissioning process "has been a lot more complex than anyone
imagined."46
Indeed, the cloud of Fukushima's effects spread widely through
Japan. Before March 11, nuclear power comprised roughly one-third
of the nation's electricity production. Today, all of the country's
reactors but two remain offline, as many undergo upgrades to comply
with stricter safety standards and others are decommissioned. 47 The
effect on the nation's energy system is deep. Japan has begun burning
42.
Path to Restoration: Contaminated Water Plagues Fukushima
Decommissioning,JAPAN NEWS, Mar. 7, 2015; see also Makinen, supra note 32; Nagata,
supra note 15.
Nagata, supranote 15; see also Fukushima Operator Struggles to Build Ice
43.
Wall to Contain Radioactive Water, GUARDIAN (June 17, 2014), http://
www.theguardian.com/ environment/2014/jun/17/fukushima-ice-wall-radioactive-water
[http://perma.cc/6QCR-KRLA] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (detailing the complicated
process that is building a frozen wall of soil); Cunningham, supra note 35 ("TEPCO
plans on building an intricate array of coolant pipes underneath the reactors, freezing
the soil into a hardened ice wall that will block the flow of water."). The subdrain pits
are expected to halve the volume of water entering the buildings, to 150 tons per day.
Yomiuri Shimbun, Release of Treated Water into Sea a Step Toward Fukushima
Decommissioning, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://the-japannews.com/news/article/0002353495.
44.
Martin Fackler, Fuel Rods Are Removed From Damaged Fukushima
Reactor Building, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/
world/asialfuel-rods-are-removed-from-japans-damaged-fukushima-reactor.html [http://
perma.cc/DX72-4SUP] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
45.
Looking Inside Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Feb.
10, 2015), http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-Looking-inside-Fukushima-Daiichiunit-1-1002154.html [http://perma.cc/T9GE-LQSC] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
46.
Makinen, supranote 32.
47.
See Kentaro Hamada, Japan Utilities Set to Scrap Five Aging Nuclear
Reactors, REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2015, 5:38 AM), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2015/
[http://perma.cc/
03/17/us.japan-nuclear-decommission-idUSKBNOMDOWX20150317
WED3-Q2VD] (archived Sept. 27, 2015) (reporting that all of Japan's reactors were
taken offline after the Fukushima disaster and as many as two-thirds may never
return to service). Despite public opposition, Japan restarted its first nuclear reactor
since the Fukushima accident in August 2015. Paul Armstrong, Japan Restarts First
Nuclear Reactor Since FukushimaDisaster, CNN (Aug. 12, 2015, 9:52 PM), http://www.
cnn.com/2015/08/11/asia/japan-nuclear-reactor/ [http://perma.cc/9XSF-UZGR] (archived
Oct. 16, 2015).
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record amounts of coal to make up for the gap left by the loss of
nuclear power, increasing electricity production from this source by 6
percent.4 8 Greenhouse gas emissions likewise are up 1.6 percent.4 9
Nonetheless, the nation has also made substantial energy gains, with
LEDs comprising 30 percent of all light bulbs sold since 2012 and a
new goal in place to make all new public buildings and homes netzero energy by 2030.50
Meanwhile, nuclear energy policy in Japan continues to yo-yo.
The year before the disaster, the government had announced it would
build fourteen new reactors, increasing the resource's share of
electricity production from 30 to 50 percent by 2030. 51 After the
meltdowns, then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan declared that Japan
would abandon nuclear power, only to later clarify that his statement
was a personal preference and not an official position. 52

48.

Japan Plans to Restart some Nuclear Plants in 2015 After Fukushima

Shutdown, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Feb. 11, 2015), http://
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19951 [http://perma.cc/7LYQ-V678] (archived
Oct.
16,
2015);
Japan, U.S.
ENERGY
INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ja
[http://perma.cclG7RS-A7FC] (archived
Oct. 23, 2015); International Energy Statistics, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION,

http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=3&pid=26&aid=2
[http://perma.cc3CWM.ZQUU] (archived Oct. 23, 2015); see also With Nuclear Offline,
JapanTurns to Coal, CLIMATEWIRE, Mar. 16, 2015.
49.
Aaron Sheldrick & Osamu Tsukimori, As Japan Burns More Fuel, Climate
Policies under Pressure, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
12/12/climatechange-japan-idUSL3NOTL1U220141212
[http://perma.cclNPC4-ZY3R]
(archived Sept. 14, 2015).
50.
Nuclear Shutdown Sparks Energy Efficiency Gains, GREENWIRE, Feb. 26,
2015.
51.
Peter Drysdale, Japan's Energy Options After Fukushima, EAST ASIA
FORUM (Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/05/japans-energy-optionsafter-fukushimal [http://perma.cc/MKP2-NFUB] (archived Sept. 14, 2015); Peter
Fairley, JapanFaces Post-FukushimaPower Struggle, IEEE SPECTRUM (July 28, 2011),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech/solar/japan-faces-postfukushima-power-struggle
[http://perma.cc/9PSA-765U] (archived Sept. 14, 2015); see also Bright Ideas Needed:
Japan's Power Monopolies Raise Costs and Stifle Innovation, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17,
2011); Suvendrini Kakuchi, Energy-Saving 'Setsuden' Campaign Sweeps Japan After
Fukushima, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2011/aug/22/energy-saving-setsuden-japan-fukushima
[http://perma.cclS9CZ-2LMQ]
(archived Sept. 14, 2015); Yoree Koh, Summer's Over: 'Setsuden' Summer, That Is,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://blogs.wsj.com/japanrealtime/2011/09/13/summersover-setsuden-summer-that-is/ [http://perma.cclN8L6-T222] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).
52.
Drysdale, supra note 51; Fukushima to Scrap Nuclear Plants: Prefecture
Vows to Shift from Atomic to Renewable Energy, JAPAN TIMES (July 16, 2011), http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20llO7l6a4.html [http://perma.cc/FF2Z-5LQV] (archived
Sept. 14, 2015); Kan's Nuclear Phase-Out Plan Draws Anger over Lack of Details,
Talks, ASAHI SHIMBUN (July 14, 2011), http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/
fukushima/AJ201107144468 [http://perma.cc/N59H-8AM7] (archived Sept. 14, 2015);
Kan Says Call to End Nuclear Power Was Only a Personal View, ASAHI SHIMBUN (July
15, 2011), http://ajw.asahi.comlarticle/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201107154682 [http://
perma.cc/FJ6P-MFL2] (archived Sept. 14, 2015); see also David Biello, The Nuclear
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Subsequently, Kan's successor, Yoshihiko Noda, announced a
compromise path: Japan would not build new facilities but would
continue to use existing nuclear plants.53 Since, the new government
of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has said that nuclear power will need
to make up about 20 percent of electricity production long-term, and
steps are being taken to restart some of the nation's nearly fifty idled
reactors. 54 All this has taken place against a broader social backdrop
that, just after the disasters, showed as many as 74 percent of
Japanese citizens supporting a nuclear phaseout and 84 percent
opposing the construction of new plants.55 Even officials engaged in
nuclear power production agree that Fukushima has changed the
energy landscape. "We have to honestly and deeply reflect on the
accident," TEPCO's managing executive officer, Takafumi Anegawa
has said. 5 6 Akira Ono, Fukushima Daiichi's plant superintendent,
concurs: "Because of the accident, nuclear energy is an issue that
should be discussed again in our country."57

III. THE SHADOW: GLOBAL REACTIONS TO FUKUSHIMA
One would expect that the reverberations of any disaster as
cataclysmic as Fukushima would be far-reaching. Particularly for an
Odyssey of Naoto Kan, Japan's Prime Minister During Fukushima, Sci. AM., Oct. 16,
2013,
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/nuclear-power-odyssey-of-naoto-kanformer-japan-prime-minister-during-fukushimal (http://perma.ce/8Q7C-THN6] (archived
Sept. 27. 2015).
53.
Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Leader to Keep Nuclear Phase-Out, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/03/world/asia/03japan.html [http://
perma.cc/AZM4-AJY5] (archived Sept. 14, 2015) ("To build new reactors is unrealistic,
and we will decommission reactors at the end of their life spans . . . . But it is also
impossible to immediately reduce our dependence to zero.").

54.
Ruling Party Wants to Increase Nuclear Share of Energy Mix, GREENWIRE,
Apr. 3, 2015; Nuclear Takes a Step Forward in Japan as Reactor Clears Regulatory
Hurdle, CLIMATEWIRE, Mar. 19, 2015; see also Martin Fackler, Three Years After
Fukushima, Japan Approves a Nuclear Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/asia/japanese-nuclear-plant-declared-safe-to-operate-forfirst-time-since-fukushima-daiichi-disaster.html [http://perma.cc/985E-B5YT] (archived
on Sept. 27. 2015); Martin Fackler, Warily Leading Japan's Nuclear Reawakening,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/21/worldlasia/warilyleading-japans-nuclear-reawakening.html [http://perma.cc/CRR9-VCU3] (archived on
Sept. 27. 2015). For more on the course of nuclear policy in Japan post-Fukushima, see
T.N. Srinivasan & T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, Fukushima and Thereafter: Reassessment of
Risks of Nuclear Power, 52 ENERGY POL'Y 726, 732 (2013); Yang-Hyun Koo et al.,

Radioactivity Release from the Fukushima Accident and its Consequences: A Review, 74
PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 61 (2014).

55.

Opposition to Nuclear Energy Grows: Global Poll, GLOBESCAN (Nov. 25,

2011) [hereinafter BBC 2011], http://www.globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/
bbc2011_nuclear-energy/bbc2011_energy.pdf [http://perma.cc/7TRL-E42F] (archived
Sept. 14, 2015); Drysdale, supra note 51.
56.
Beech, supranote 1.
Id.
57.

FUKUSHIMA'S SHADOW

2015]

1095

industry like nuclear power, which long has been situated in an
uneasy place, 58 common sense might predict that the triple meltdown
at Fukushima would put the brakes on nuclear power. Thus, it came
as no surprise that, in the disaster's immediate aftermath, many
commentators fervently declared Fukushima Daiichi a "death knell"
for the nuclear industry.59
There was something to these predictions. Public approval of
nuclear power certainly declined worldwide after the disaster. For
instance, a BBC-commissioned survey conducted in November 2011 of
nearly 25,000 people in twenty-three countries found public opinion
increasingly skeptical about nuclear energy: only 39 percent agreed
that their country should continue using existing reactors (without
building new ones), and 30 percent wanted to shut everything down
immediately.6 0 Likewise, an April 2011 Reuters survey revealed that
62 percent of respondents in twenty-four countries opposed nuclear
power, and that more than a quarter of those individuals had
changed their previously held attitudes as a result of Fukushima. 61
Fukushima's shadow, moreover, was not limited to public
opinion. The disaster also impacted nuclear plant operations.
Following the Fukushima Daiichi meltdowns, worldwide production
of nuclear power declined significantly, 62 as some plants closed

58.
See generally AMORY LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE
PEACE (1977).

59.
After the accident, Christopher Flavin, President of Worldwatch,
proclaimed that "the Fukushima disaster is an historic-if not fatal-setback." See
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, supra note 13; see also Victor Nian & S.K. Chou, The State of
Nuclear Power Two Years After Fukushima - The ASEAN Perspective, 136 Applied
Energy 838, 840 (2014); Per Lekander et al., supra note 13; Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear
Power's Death Somewhat Exaggerated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2012, http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/04/1 1/business/energy-environment/nuclear-powers-death-somewhatexaggerated.html [http://perma.cc/32MK-79UL] (archived Sept. 27. 2015); Nuclear
Scholars Initiative: A Collection of Papersfrom the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative,
CENTER

FOR

STRATEGIC

AND

INTERNATIONAL

STUDIES

18

(Jan.

2014),

http://csis.org/files/publication/140109 WeinerNuclearScholarslnitiative20l3_WEB.pd
f [http://perma.cc/4VLE-H2TE] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).
60.
BBC 2011, supra note 55. In particular, from 2005 to 2011, the proportion
of people opposed to building new nuclear power reactors increased from 73 to 90
percent in Germany, 66 to 83 percent in France, 61 to 83 percent in Russia, and 76 to
84 percent in Japan. Id. Only the United States and the United Kingdom bucked this
trend, with support remaining unchanged at 40 percent in the United States, and
rising from 33 to 37 percent in the United Kingdom. Id.
61.
Ipsos Global @dvisory: Sharp World Wide Drop in Support for Nuclear
Energy as 26% of New Opponents Say Fukushima Drove Their Decision, IPSOS (June
20, 2011), http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=5265 [http://perma.
cc/52S5-26AL] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).
INFORMATION
Statistics,
U.S.
ENERGY
62.
International Energy
ADMINISTRATION, [hereinafter Energy Statistics] http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/
(last
iedindex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=27&aid=12&cid=&syid=2004&eyid=2008&unit=BKWH
visited Jan. 5, 2014) [http://perma.cc/K2CB-TUZR] (archived Sept. 27, 2015); see also
Mycle Schneider et al., World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2014, THE WORLD
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permanently, and numerous others suspended operations or
construction. 6 3 Prior to the accident, 442 nuclear reactors in thirty
countries produced 14 percent of the world's electricity, whereas in
2012, 427 reactors worldwide produced only 11 percent of electricity
globally. 64 By 2013, 434 reactors in thirty countries 6 5 produced 10.8
percent of electricity.66
While the initial response to Fukushima was very much what
common sense might have predicted, the disaster's longer-term
implications have proven to be more nuanced. Fukushima Daiichi
may have shocked the global nuclear industry initially, but just four
years out, Fukushima seems to have left only a modest, if lasting,
mark on the global energy landscape. The nuclear industry has
weathered the storm and, today, appears quite stable in some
countries and growing in others.6 7 Indeed, as of April 2015, thirty
countries worldwide are operating 438 nuclear reactors-only four
fewer than were in operation before Fukushima. 6 8 Further, while
some countries, like Germany, have moved sharply away from
nuclear energy post-Fukushima, the heavy media attention those
countries have received obscures the fuller picture.
Nations' reactions to the Fukushima disaster are not monolithic,
but rather, diverse. In broad strokes, they can be grouped into three
categories: countries that (1) abdicated nuclear energy, or are now
moving swiftly away from it; (2) roughly kept their status quo; and
(3) are expanding their use of nuclear energy despite Fukushima.
That the nuclear narrative post-Fukushima is following these three
paths-rather than a singular one away from nuclear useunderscores that while disasters can have important, lasting effects,
the shape and scope of those effects, including how they manifest in
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY STATUS REPORT (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.worldnuclearreport.
org/WNISR2014.html [http://perma.cc/2EMS-5KGF] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).
63.
See infra sections A-C.
64.
Ivana Kottasova, Interactive: How Fukushima changed world's attitudes to
nuclear power, CNN (Mar. 12, 2014), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/12/business/
nuclear-power-after-fukushima/#index. [http://perma.cc/4RWR-XWJG] (archived Sept.
27, 2015). This drop was a result of the retirement of fifteen reactors from service,
including eight in Germany and four in Japan as a result of Fukushima, and two in the
United Kingdom and one in Canada, which had reached the end of their operational
lifetimes. The idling of all forty-eight of Japan's operational reactors is not accounted
for in this number. Energy Statistics, supra note 62.
65.
Nuclear Power Reactors in the World, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY 6 (2014), available at http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/rds-234_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/RLQ7-QR7N] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).
66.
Mycle Schneider et al., supra note 62; Mycle Schneider et al., THE WORLD
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY STATUS REPORT 2015, July 2015, http://www.worldnuclear
report.org/-2015-.html [http://perma.cc/N8TM-5QPD] (archived Oct. 16, 2015).
67.
See infra Parts III.B-C.
68.
Operational & Long-Term Shutdown Reactors, INTERNATIONAL ATOMic
http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsBy
ENERGY AGENCY,
Country.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2015) [http://perma.cc/P986-975Y] (archived Sept. 27,
2015).
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law and policy, are often much more country-specific and varied than
might be anticipated.
In fact, looking beneath the surface, different countries' reactions
to Fukushima Daiichi may comport well with what a careful
contextual analysis might have predicted. Generally, countries that
chose to abdicate nuclear energy post-Fukushima already harbored
deep-seated opposition to it before the disaster.69 On the other hand,
those that kept the status quo, such as the United States, France,
and the United Kingdom, rely quite heavily on the resource and have
not been as politically conflicted about its use historically.
Accordingly, they did not change their overall nuclear promotion
policies but instead conducted safety and stress tests, and some
safety upgrades, 70 while otherwise essentially continuing operations
as before. Finally, a number of countries, including China, India,
Russia, and South Korea, which are growing rapidly or are heavily
reliant on energy imports, have expanded their use of nuclear power
despite the Fukushima disaster. 71 Indeed, these countries have
specifically noted the need to meet rising electricity demands, limit
foreign and fossil fuel reliance, reduce pollution, and ensure a stable,
affordable energy supply. 7 2 Thus, although the general response postFukushima was for countries to perform safety checks, 7 the
similarity among countries' responses largely ends there.

69.
Masatsuga Hayashi & Larry Hughes, The Fukushima Nuclear Accident
and its Global Effect on Global Energy Security, 59 ENERGY POL'Y 102, 106 (2012).
70.
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, OECD, NUCLEAR ENERGY TODAY 3 (2012),
available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/pub/nuclearenergytoday/6885-nuclear-energytoday.pdf [http://perma.cclL9SX-Z79Q] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).
71.
See infra Part III.C.
72.
See infra Part III.C.
73.
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, supra note 70. However, these safety tests
were conducted at nuclear reactors in nearly all nuclear-producing countries. See id.;
Member Countries and Dates of Accession, NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, https://
www.oecd-nea.org/nealmcnea.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2015) [https://perma.cc/6LNXTN2W] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR
ASSOCIATION, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-Security/Safety-of-Plants/
Safety-of-Nuclear-Power-Reactors/ (last visited Feb. 2015) [http://perma.cc/97QLG9TG] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); EU Member States, ENSREG, http://www.ensreg.eu/
EU-Stress-Tests/Country-Specific-Reports/EU-Member-States
(last visited Apr. 9,
2015) [http://perma.cclD53H-WERS] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); Enhancing Nuclear
Reactor Safety in Africa: The IAEA Conducts an IntegratedNuclear Safety Assessment
of Research Reactors (INSARR) Mission in South Africa with EC Report, IAEA.ORG
(Nov. 8, 2013), https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Home/Highlights-Archive/
Archive-2013/11082013-INSARR.html [https://perma.cc/4EFH-SY4Z] (archived Sept.
28, 2015); Nuclear Power in China, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/China--Nuclear-Power/
(last visited
Mar. 31, 2015) [http://perma.cc/MFL6-9NJ8] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); Chris Cote et
al., Brazil's NuclearPower Plans Three Years After Fukushima:A Brazil Works Briefing
Paper,BRAZILWORKS (Apr. 2014), at 5, http://www.brazil-works.comlwp-content/uploads/
2014/04/BrazilE2%80%99s-Nuclear-Power-Plans-Three-Years-after-Fukushima.pdf
[http://perma.cclJ8BN-9TSS] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).

1098

VANDERBILT ]OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW [VOL. 48:1083

The remainder of this Part explores the three key reactions that
nations had to the Fukushima disaster in their nuclear policies:
abandonment of nuclear energy; continued use with safety checks and
other prophylactic measures, that is, effectively the status quo; and
expansion of nuclear power. To highlight these three responses, the
Part focuses on one exemplar country from each category: Germany
for abandonment, the United States for the status quo, and China for
expansion.
A. Abandonment
Fukushima pushed some countries to abandon nuclear power
entirely, or to forego plans to use the technology. The countries that
fit this category should not be surprising. Most already harbored
deep-seated opposition to nuclear energy, with sizeable anti-nuclear
lobbies, 74 or low public opinion of the technology, which plummeted
further following the disaster.75 Fukushima, then, became a talisman:
for some countries, a convenient symbol to call for change; for others,
a warning signal not to proceed. Consequently, three nuclearproducing countries-Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium-backed
out of their nuclear programs entirely, 76 and others that had been
considering building plants-including Italy, Bahrain, Kuwait, and
Oman-abandoned their investigations. 7 Perhaps most notably,
however, while these countries' choices received substantial
attention, especially in the press, 7 8 the number of nations that chose
this path is not particularly large.

74.
Hayashi & Hughes, supra note 69.
For further discussion of public opinion pre- and post-disaster, see infra
75.
notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
76.
For specific discussion of all three countries' decisions, see infra notes 9399 and accompanying text.
77.
Ali Ahmad & M.V. Ramana, Too Costly to Matter: Economics of Nuclear
Power for Saudi Arabia, 69 ENERGY 682, 682 (2014).
78.
See, e.g., Belgium Plans to Phase Out Nuclear Power, BBC (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe15521865 [http://perma.cclC7PD-YJX4](archived
Sept. 14, 2015); Juergen Baetz, Merkel Reverses Nuclear Energy Plan, WASH. TIMES
(May 30, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/may/30/merkel-reversesnuclear-energy-plan/?page=all [http://perma.cc/HWG2-ELJE] (archived Sept. 28, 2015);
Stephen Evans, Nuclear Phase-Out Can Make Germany Trailblazer - Merkel, BBC
[http://perma.cc/
(May 31, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13597627
AW7T-BZN7] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); Stephen Faris, Italy Says No to Nuclear Power
- and to Berlusconi, TIME (June 14, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,2077622,00.html [http://perma.cc/L7YK-92KF] (archived Sept. 28, 2015);
James Kanter, Switzerland Decides on Nuclear Phase-Out, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2011),
[http://perma.cc/
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/26/business/global/26nuclear.html
27NL-NT5V] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); Duncan Kennedy, Italy Nuclear: Berlusconi
Accepts Referendum Blow, BBC (June 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-13741105 [http://perma.cc/4XEA-UAZV] (archived Sept. 14, 2015).
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Of these countries, Germany's announcement that it would
abandon nuclear power by 2022 perhaps received the most
attention.79 In the wake of Fukushima, Germany's already deep
public opposition to nuclear power grew even stronger,8 0 and the
government wasted no time in responding. Immediately after the
tsunami, Germany's federal parliament, joined by state governments
(Lander), requested a safety review of the nuclear power plants in
Germany. 81 Germany's Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety heeded that call, asking the Reactor
Safety Commission (RSK) to perform a "comprehensive safety review
for preparing a political and regulatory decision." 82
The RSK carried out its safety review in two months, beginning
March 15, 2011. Its emphasis was on the possibility of Fukushimarelated natural hazards at German reactors, though it also examined
other risks, such as aircraft crashes, as its aim was to assess all
hazards beyond those previously considered. 83 Ultimately, RSK
concluded that German plants featured more safeguards than those
at Fukushima Daiichi. 84

79.
Germany to Shut All Nuke Plants: Merkel, CHINA DAILY (May 31, 2011),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-05/31/content_12612106.htm [http://perma.cc/
R75X-GNS6] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); Osha Gray Davidson, NuclearAdvocate Merkel
Flips: Says Germany to Quit Nukes by 2022, FORBES (May 30, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/oshadavidson/2011/05/30/nuclear-advocate-merkel-flipssays-germany-to-quit-nukes-by-2022/ [http://perma.cc/49F5-YRX9 (archived Sept. 28,
2015); Osha Gray Davidson, So Far So Good for Germany's Nuclear Phase-Out, Despite
Dire Predictions, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Nov. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Davidson, So Far
So Good], http://insideclimatenews.org/news/20121115/germany-energiewende-nuclearenergy-fukushima-chernobyl-merkel-renewables [http://perma.cc/5KA8-6JHQ] (archived
Sept. 28, 2015); Helen Pidd, Germany to Shut All Nuclear Reactors, GUARDIAN (May
30, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/may/30/germany-to-shut-nuclearreactors [http://perma.cclTS3M-NTPQ] (archived Sept. 28, 2015).
80.
Opposition to building reactors in Germany was 73 percent in 2005 and 90
percent in 2011. See loannis N. Kessides, The Future of the Nuclear Industry
Reconsidered:Risks, Uncertainties,and Continued Promise, 48 ENERGY POL'Y 185, 187
(2012); BBC 2011, supra note 55.
81.
FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION AND
NUCLEAR SAFETY, EUROPEAN NUCLEAR SAFETY REGULATIONS GROUP, EU STRESSTEST:
NATIONAL REPORT OF GERMANY 5 (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter EU STRESSTEST], http://

www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/fukushimaldocuments/GERMANY-Progress-ReportLGermany
15.09.11_13Uhr.pdf [http://perma.ccl5Q5R-VQJE] (archived Sept. 28, 2015); FEDERAL
MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY,
GERMAN ACTION PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MEASURES AFTER THE FUKUSHIMA
DAl-ICHI REACTOR ACCIDENT (Dec. 31, 2012) [hereinafter GERMAN NATIONAL REPORT].
EU STRESSTEST, supra note 81, at 5-6.
82.

83.
The German nuclear power plant operators also carried out their own
assessments immediately after the accident. Their initial studies found no indication of
any deficiencies in design, although they identified potential further safeguard
improvements. Id. at 6.
84.
Developments in Germany Following the nuclear disaster in Japan,
FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION, BUILDING AND

NUCLEAR SAFETY (last updated Oct. 3, 2014),) [hereinafter Germany Developments],
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During this review, Germany appointed the "Ethics Commission
for a Safe Energy Supply" to find public consensus on future energy
supply. 85 The Commission concluded that, although the risks
associated with nuclear energy had not changed, the way these risks
are perceived had because of Fukushima. 86 As a result, the
Commission called for decreasing the country's reliance on nuclear
energy and for abandoning its use within a decade. 87
Germany then quickly did an about-face on nuclear energy. After
having safely used the technology for over fifty years,8 8 and having
decided only the year prior to extend the lives of all seventeen of the
country's nuclear power facilities,8 9 the government announced that it
would abandon the resource by 2022.90 German Chancellor Angela
Merkel delivered the message: "We learned from Fukushima that we
have to deal differently with risks," and "[w]e believe we as a country
can be a trailblazer for a new age of renewable energy sources."9 1
http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/nuclear-safety-radiological-protection/nuclearsafety/response-to-fukushimaloverview/ [http://perma.cc/X6UQ-67KB] (archived Sept.
28, 2015).
85.
Judy Dempsey & Jack Ewing, Germany, in Reversal, Will Close Nuclear
Plants by 2022, N.Y. TIMES (May 30 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/
worldleurope/31germany.html? r=0 [http://perma.cc/4RZP-3F9J] (archived Sept. 28,
2015); Germany Developments, supra note 84; GERMAN NATIONAL REPORT, supra note
81, at 7.
Germany Developments, supranote 84.
86.
87.
Id.; FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE CONSERVATION
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, CONVENTION ON NUCLEAR SAFETY: REPORT BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FOR THE SIXTH REVIEW

MEETING IN MARCH/APRIL 2014 13 (June 26, 2013) [hereinafter GERMANY 2014
at
http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/DatenBMU/Pools/
REPORT],
available
Broschueren/bericht uebereinkommennukl-sicherheitenbf.pdf
[http://perma.cc/46
7D-BVBX] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
88.
See Nuclear Power in Germany, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, http://
(last visited
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Germany/
Sept. 6, 2015) [http://perma.cc/X7FU-4SXS] (archived Sept. 6, 2015) (detailing the
history of nuclear power in Germany); see also GERMANY 2014 REPORT, supra note 87,
at 14.
Larry Greenemeier, Should Japan's Reactor Crisis Kill the Nuclear
89.
Renaissance? SCIENTIFIC AM. (Mar. 17, 2011), http://www.scientificamerican.com/
article/japan-nuclear-renaissance/ [http://perma.cc/W89C-GMMT] (archived Sept. 6,
2015). In 2010, Merkel explained that nuclear power was "desirable as a bridging
technology" to renewables. Slowing the Phase-Out: Merkel Wants to Extend Nuclear
Power Plant Lifespans, SPIEGEL (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/slowing-the-phase-out-merkel-wants-to-extend-nuclear-power-plant-lifespansa-714580.html [http://perma.cc/TG4C-T7SK] (archived Sept. 6, 2015); see also Kate
Connolly, Germany Agrees to Extend Life of Nuclear Power Stations, GUARDIAN (Sept. 6,
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/06/germany-extend-nuclear-powerstations [http://perma.ce/AP4L-GV6U] (archived Sept. 6, 2015); Andrea Wong & Lucy
Meakin, E.ON, RWE Shares Surge on Merkel's Nuclear Lifeline, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 6,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-05/merkel-coalition-proposes12-year-nuclear-reactor-extension-for-germany [http://perma.cc/3K77-G9J5] (archived
Sept. 6, 2015).
90.
GERMANY 2014 REPORT, supra note 87, at 16.
91.
Evans, supra note 78.
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This announcement was not a standalone policy decision. Rather,
Merkel's disavowal of nuclear power came as part of a broader
pronouncement of a new German energy policy for the twenty-first
century-its Energiewende, or "energy turnaround." 92 The
Energiewende was a declaration of energy revolution in Germany. In
addition to announcing the plan to permanently close all of
Germany's nuclear plants by 2022,93 the Energiewende policy aims to
reduce C02 emissions by 40 percent and to double Germany's
electricity production from renewables to 35 percent. 94
To accomplish the Energiewende's objectives for nuclear power,
the government thus quickly amended its Atomic Energy Act, setting
in motion plans to permanently shut down Germany's eight oldest
reactors in August 2011.95 The amendments also approved plans to
phase out Germany's other nine reactors by 2022.96

Though Germany might have been inclined in this direction
anyway, the government seized on Fukushima as an impetus for
change. As Jiirgen Becker, Germany's deputy environment minister
at the time, said, "Japan has shown that even if there is a miniscule
occurrence, the residual risk is too high to justify the continuation of

92.
Energy Transition: The German Energiewende, ENERGIEWENDE GERMANY,
http://energytransition.de/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) [http://perma.cc/6UNL-ACPS]
(archived Sept. 6, 2015); GERMAN NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 81; Kottasova, supra
note 64; Lars Ditmar & Georg Erdmann, Generation in Germany Under
Decarbonisation: The German "Energiewende" 2 (Nov. 2013), available at
http://www.iea.org/medialtraining/bangkoknovl3/session-4bgermany-generation.pdf.
[http://perma.cclA2X9-2DKA] (archived Sept. 6, 2015); UPDATE 3-Germany to Shut
Down Pre-1980 Nuclear Plants, REUTERS (March 15, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/03/15/germany-nuclear-idUSLDE72E17620110315
[http://perma.ccl5N39F6Q2] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
93.
Davidson, So Far So Good, supra note 79. These plants include Germany's
seven oldest reactors, which were initially taken off the grid pending safety inspections
after Fukushima, and an eighth that has been offline for years as a result of technical
problems. Baetz, supra note 78; Germany to Shut All Nuke Plants: Merkel, supra note
79.
94.
Baetz, supra note 78.
95.
Seven of these had already been switched offline in March, and one was
offline prior to the accident for refueling. Davidson, So Far So Good, supra note 79;
General information:Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security, FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT,
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http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/nuclear-safety-radiological-protection/nuclearsafety/general-information/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) [http://perma.ce/6HA7-S5LF]
(archived Sept. 6, 2015); Questions and Answers on the Situation in Japan and the
Possible Impact on Germany, FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE
CONSERVATION, BUILDING AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/topics/

nuclear-safety-radiological-protection/nuclear-safety/response-to-fukushima/questionsand-answers/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8WMR-VUFX] (archived Sept.
6, 2015).
Kottasova, supra note 64; Schneider et al., supra note 66.
96.

1,102

VANDERBILT]OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW [VOL. 48:1083

nuclear power." 97 Chancellor Merkel put it even more starkly,
emphasizing that "the country must 'not let go the chance' to end its
dependence on nuclear power." 98
Like Germany, a number of other countries abandoned or
decided to forego the use of nuclear energy post-Fukushima.
Switzerland, which has five nuclear reactors producing 40 percent of
the country's electricity, decided to abandon the technology by 2034.99
Unlike Germany, however, Switzerland had planned, prior to
Fukushima, to replace its aging reactors and in fact had three
construction applications under consideration.10 0 In some ways, then,
Switzerland's reversal of nuclear policy post-Fukushima was even
sharper than Germany's.10 1 The people of Italy also turned down a
government plan to construct new plants after Fukushima, 102 a
decision that came as part of a referendum to reject a proposal to relaunch nuclear power after it had been banned in 1987.103 Finally,
Belgium, which had already decided in 2003 to abandon its nuclear
plants beginning in 2015 and ending in 2025,104 confirmed its closure
policy in the wake of Fukushima.

97.
MYCLE SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE WORLD NUCLEAR INDUSTRY STATUS
REPORT, 2010-2011: NUCLEAR POWER IN A POST-FUKUSHIMA WORLD: 25 YEARS AFTER

&

THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT" 45-46 (April 2011), available at http://www.world
watch.org/system/files/WorldNuclearIndustryStatusReport2l1_%20FINAL.pdf [http://
perma.cc/B8TU-RTMG] (archived Sept. 6, 2015). The German government has
reaffirmed this plan. See Press Release No. 039/14 Berlin, March 10, 2014; Press
Release, On the Occasion of the Third Anniversary of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster
Fed'1 Env't Minister Barbara Hendrick States:, FED. MINISTRY FOR THE ENV'T, NATURE
CONSERVATION, BLDG. & NUCLEAR SAFETY (Mar. 10, 2014) [hereinafter Hendrick
Statement], http://www.bmub.bund.de/en/press/press-releases/detailansicht-enlartikelizu
m-3-jahrestag-der-atomkatastrophe-von-fukushima-erklaert-bundesumweltministerinbarbara-hendricks/?tx-ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=255&cHash=9el2682d07aa3fb0b922c
6238ff5545 [http://perma.cc/VC49-884B] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
98.
Dempsey & Ewing, supranote 85; see also Hendrick Statement, supra note
97 ("[Tlhe events in Fukushima once again reminded us of the risks associated with the
use of nuclear energy, and that the so-called residual risk is real and not just a
theoretical risk. The sad and terrifying events in Fukushima have made it clear that
the quickest possible phase-out of nuclear energy and consistent advancement of our
energy system transformation are the way forward.") (statement of Federal
Environment Minister Barbara Hendricks in 2014).
Koo et al., surpanote 54, at 68.
99.
100.
Michael Siegrist, et. al, Why have some people changed their attitudes
toward nuclear power after the accident in Fukushima, 69 ENERGY POL'Y 356, 358
(2014).
101.
See id.; Kanter, supra note 78.
102.
Hayashi & Hughes, supra note 69, at 106.
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 97, at 46; see also Giada Zampano
103.
Nathania Zevi, Italians Vote to Abandon Nuclear Energy, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2011),
http://onlinewsj.comlarticles/SB10001424052702303714704576383452729642270
(subscription required) [http://perma.cc/A6DA-3BD8] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
Nuclear Power in Belgium, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, http://
104.
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-A-F/Belgium/ (last visited Sept.
6, 2015) [http://perma.cc/LM2J-UQA8] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).

2015]

FUKUSHIMA'S SHADOW

1103

Altogether, then, these four countries-along with four others
that announced decisions post-Fukushima not to pursue prior plans
to introduce nuclear energy to their borders-established one of the
three key paths nations have followed in altering their energy policies
in the wake of this disaster. 105 Notably, however, this path is a
decided minority position. By far, more countries are either
maintaining or expanding their nuclear programs.
B. Status Quo
In contrast to nations that backed away from nuclear power,
many others chose to continue to rely heavily on the technology postFukushima, even as they took measures to ensure that the events in
Japan would not be repeated in their jurisdictions.
Specifically, the United States, France, Sweden, and the Czech
Republic all have maintained their existing policies of promoting
nuclear power. In doing so, they cited a bevy of reasons, including the
importance of nuclear power to overall electricity supplies, the need
to address climate change, keeping prices down, and fostering
domestic industry.' 06 As former French President Nicolas Sarkozy
said shortly after the disaster, "[t]here is no alternative to nuclear
energy today," 10 7 and a moratorium on new nuclear plants is a "choice
08
of the past, of the Middle Ages."
Likewise, other countries, though not as strident in their defense
of nuclear power, nevertheless have effectively stayed the course
since Fukushima. These jurisdictions, including Bulgaria, Canada,
Finland, and the Netherlands, 109 all indicated that they would
reexamine their use of nuclear power in Fukushima's wake but have
not made any significant changes since. Rather, across the board, the
countries in this status quo category have been careful to bolster

See Ahmad & Ramana, supra note 77 (Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman
105.
abandoned plans to introduce nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident).
Yuhji Matsuo et al., A global energy outlook to 2035 with strategic
106.
considerationsfor Asia and Middle East energy supply and demand interdependencies,
ENERGY STRATEGY REVIEWS 79, 87 (2013).

Kim Willsher, Nicolas Sarkozy makes 0lbn commitment to Nuclear Power,
107.
GUARDIAN (June 27, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/27/nicolassarkozy-france-nuclear-power [http://perma.cc/T3X4-UWLN] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
Ann MacLachlan, France's Sarkozy Denounces Nuclear Phase-Out Calls as
108.
"Medieval", PLATTS (May 3, 2011, 11:10 AM), http://www.platts.comlatestnews/electric-power/paris/frances-sarkozy-denounces-nuclear-phase-out-calls-8841312
[http://perma.cc/V2XW-D3CE] (archived Sept. 29, 2015).
See Actions Taken by Regulatory Bodies and International Organisations
109.
Following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY (last
visited Sept. 6, 2015) [hereinafter NEA Regulatory Actions], http://www.oecdnea.org/nsd/fukushimal [http://perma.cc/9WST-JDKM] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
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safety measures, but otherwise have not significantly altered their
policies on nuclear energy.110
The United States is a leading example. The United States
generates nearly one-third of the world's nuclear power, with ninetynine reactors producing roughly one-fifth the nation's electricity."'
Today, five more reactors are under construction, 112 and public
support for the technology is on the rise. Although public support for
nuclear power dipped by twenty-one percentage points in the United
States following Fukushima, 113 by March 2012, nuclear energy's
approval rating was on the rebound-up four points and essentially
identical to the rating measured just before the accident in early
March 2011.114 Indeed, today, at least one poll shows support for
nuclear energy in the United States at 63 percent, or one point higher
than in 2010.115
Given the nation's heavy reliance on nuclear energy, and the
relatively high approval rating for it in the United States, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the U.S. policy reaction to Fukushima was
basically incremental. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
ordered safety reviews of the country's then-104 reactors,1 16 delayed

110.
Koo et al., supra note 54, at 68. Altogether, stress tests and safety checks
were performed in Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, South Korea, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Romania,
the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See NEA
Regulatory Actions, supra note 109; Nuclear Energy Agency, THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENT: OECDINEA NUCLEAR SAFETY RESPONSE AND

LESSONS LEARNT 2 (2013), available at http://www.oecd-nea.org/pub/2013/7161fukushima20l3.pdf. [http://perma.cc/TT4H-BPSU] (archived Sept. 6 2015); 2 Nuclear
Energy Agency, NUCLEAR ENERGY TODAY 3 (2012).
How Many Nuclear Power Plants Are in the United States, and Where Are
111.
They Located?, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://
www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=207&t=21 (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) [http://
perma.cc/QYZ2-8FPU] (archived Sept. 6, 2015); Nuclear Power in the USA, WORLD
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-TNUCLEAR
Assoc.,
ZIUSA--Nuclear-Power/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2015) [http://perma.ccl85PW-BW8Z]
(archived Sept. 6, 2015).
112.
Nuclear Power in the USA, supra note 111; Matt Smith, The 'Nuclear
Renaissance:' What Went Wrong?, CNN (Nov. 6, 2013, 7:18 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/11/06/us/atomic-economics/ [http://perma.cc/C4JA-B6VE] (last visited Sept. 6,
2015).
113.
The decrease was to 53 percent, compared to 74 percent in the prior year.
Kessides, supra note 80, at 187.
114.
Frank Newport, Americans Still Favor Nuclear Power a Year After
Fukushima, GALLUP (March 26, 2012) http://www.gallup.com/poll/153452/americansfavor-nuclear-power-year-fukushima.aspx [http://perma.cc/298Y-CL2J] (archived Sept.
6, 2015).
115.
Poll: Americans See Nuclear Energy as Key to Limit Carbon Emissions,
NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE (Oct. 28, 2014), http://www.nei.org/News-Media/MediaRoom/News-Releases/Poll-Americans-See-Nuclear-Energy-as-Key-to-Limit
[http://perma.cclUS3L-D52J] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
116.
Hayashi & Hughes, supra note 69, at 104.
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discussion of plans to restart reactors at one site,' 17 and, eventually,
adopted additional safety requirements nationwide in an effort to
avoid a Fukushima-like event.118
Some of these changes came quickly. In March 2011, while the
Fukushima disaster was still unfolding, the NRC ordered nuclear
operators to install enhanced equipment for monitoring water levels
in spent fuel pools, obtain additional emergency equipment, and
improve or install emergency venting systems to relieve pressure in
the event of a serious accident in facilities with a design similar to the
Fukushima facility.' 19
The next month, the NRC ordered plant inspectors to assess
facilities' readiness to implement more aggressive management
guidelines for severe accidents. 120 These inspections took a
particularly hard look at procedures to compensate for conditions like
those that occurred at Fukushima, including extensive onsite
damage, loss of power, seismic and flooding issues, and procedures for
dealing with damaged reactors.1 21
As part of its longer-term strategy, the NRC also established a
task force to review the Fukushima disaster and determine what
lessons U.S. reactors could learn from it.1 22 The task force engaged in
a wide-ranging, systematic, and methodological review of the NRC's
regulations and procedures in order to make policy recommendations
for the NRC in light of the Fukushima accident. 123 The task force
then issued recommendations on how to enhance reactor safety 124
and mitigate risks from accidents resulting from natural
phenomena.125

117.
Greenemeier, supranote 89.
118.
Backgrounder, NRC Response to Lessons Learned from Fukushima, U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/fact-sheets/japan-events.html [http://perma.cc/4FYB-LUWZ] (archived Sept.
6, 2015).
119.
Id.
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GUIDELINES (April 29, 2011), http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1111/IL11115A053.pdf
[http://perma.ce/R66A-KU62] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
See id.
121.
122.
What Are the Lessons Learned From Fukushima?, U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMM'N (April 17, 2015) [hereinafter Lessons Learned], http://
www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-dashboard/priorities.html [http://
perma.cclP37H-PA74 ] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
123.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING
REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE REVIEW OF

INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAi-ICHI ACCIDENT vii (July 12, 2011) [hereinafter
NRC RECOMMENDATIONS], http://pbadupws.nre.gov/docs/ML1118/ML111861807.pdf
[http://perma.ce/5LTJ-UPGF] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
124.
Lessons Learned, supra note 122.
Id.
125.
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The task force published its recommendations in July 2011,
concluding that the NRC's existing "regulatory approach has served
the Commission and the public well,"126 and "that a sequence of
events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United
States." 127 The task force thus determined that continued operation
of nuclear reactors in the United States does not "pose an imminent
risk to public health and safety." 128 The task force did, however, issue
a number of recommendations for clarifying the NRC's regulatory
framework and for better ensuring safety onsite at reactors.1 29 These
included evaluations and upgrades of earthquake-, flooding-, and firerelated design features; updates to facility emergency plans; and
stronger regulatory oversight of safety performance. 130 The NRC
adopted these recommendations in November 2011.131
Of course, the United States' experience post-Fukushima is
emblematic of countries in this category not because of its use of a
task force or the specific safety measures, but rather, because of the
general arc the nation's policy reaction. Much like the United States,
other countries that have basically maintained the status quo postFukushima examined safety measures, implemented incremental
changes specifically responding to the type of conditions present at
Fukushima Daiichi, and saw a rebound in public support for this
technology-all without measurably shifting course in their reliance
on nuclear power. 132

Thus, France, which leads the world in the share of electricity
produced by nuclear energy, generating 74 percent of its electricity
from fifty-eight nuclear reactors, 133 performed safety checks of all
operating reactors, but also reaffirmed its commitment to nuclear
power after Fukushima, going so far as to dedicate additional funds

126.
NRC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 123, at 18.
127.
Id. at vii.
128.
Id. at vii.
129.
Id. at viii-ix.
130.
Id. at viii-ix; see also Lessons Learned, supra note 122 (outlining a threetiered prioritization plan to increase safety of nuclear reactors).
131.
Japan Lessons Learned Division, U.S. NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/
reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan/japan-lessons-learned.htm (last updated Sept.
9, 2014) [http://perma.cc/9JPS-H3X8] (archived Sept. 5, 2015); see also Plant-Specific
Japan Lessons-Learned Activities, U.S. NRC, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/
ops-experience/japan-dashboard/japan-plants.html
(last updated June 18, 2013)
[http://perma.cclP8SL-326Q] (archived Sept. 5, 2015) (listing all operating nuclear
power plants that have adopted NRC recommendations following the Fukushima
incident).
132.
See Koo et al., supra note 54, at 68 (comparing nuclear policy of the United
States with countries who have abandoned nuclear energy in wake of Fukushima).
133.
See Kottasova, supra note 64; Willsher, supranote 107.
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to its development. 134 Similarly, the United Kingdom performed
extensive safety checks but basically saw public sentiment for
reactors remain steady after Fukushima, 13 5 with 38 percent of those
polled believing the benefits of nuclear outweighed the risks in 2010,
and 41 percent believing the same in 2011. 136 In fact, since
Fukushima, the United Kingdom gave the go-ahead for work to begin
on its first new nuclear reactor in 20 years. 137 Altogether, then, the
majority of countries have responded to Fukushima not by making a
sharp change in direction, but rather, by making minor reactor and
regulatory upgrades while effectively maintaining their existing
policy favoring the technology.
C. Expansion
A third category of countries has expanded, or is considering
expanding, their use of nuclear power technology since the
Fukushima disaster. Most notably, these include China, India,
Russia, and South Korea, each of which has also maintained
relatively positive attitudes toward the technology. 138 Indeed, one
study of Fukushima's impact on global attitudes about nuclear energy
found that China had the highest level of acceptance before the
accident at 83 percent, followed by Bulgaria, South Korea,
Bangladesh, and Russia (at 68, 65, 64, and 63 percent,
respectively). 139 It should not be particularly surprising, then, that
there is overlap in the lists of jurisdictions that heavily favored
nuclear power pre-disaster and those that have chosen to expand
their use of the technology after the meltdowns.
Of course, these countries were not unaffected by Fukushima.
The accident caused some nations to pause, others to slow down, and
many to reconsider their plans. China temporarily suspended
approval of nuclear projects, including those under development after

134.
Willsher, supra note 107, at 1; see also MYCLE SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra
note 97, at 45 (citing the French Prime Minister's request for safety audit of all nuclear
power plants).
135.
BBC 2011, supra note 55, at 1.
136.
Matt McGrath, UK Nuclear Support 'Rises After Fukushima, BBC 3 (Sept.
9, 2011), http://www.bbc.cominews/science-environment-14847875
[http://perma.cc/
6NML-K6WS] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).
137.
See Jessica Aldred & Natalie Starkey, Nuclear Power in the UK-a history,
GUARDIAN 11 (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.theguardian.comlenvironment/2013/oct/21/
nuclear-power-in-the-uk-a-history [http://perma.cclECK3-UR9G] (archived Sept. 5,
2015) (summarizing the history of nuclear power in the UK).
138.

See WIN-GALLUP, JAPAN EARTHQUAKE AND ITS IMPACT ON VIEws ABOUT

NUCLEAR ENERGY 8 (2011), http://www.gallup.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
Volume-3-_Japan-Survey.pdf [http://perma.cc/RS52-9A6H] (archived Sept. 5, 2015)
(showing data of attitudes of various countries toward nuclear power before and after
Fukushima).
139.
Id.
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Fukushima, 140 in order to undertake safety reviews. 141 Similarly,
India temporarily postponed approval of four projects after the
accident and conducted safety reviews of its existing plants under
construction and in operation. 142 It also announced that it would set
up a Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority. 143 Russia commissioned a
review of its future nuclear power sector after Fukushima,144 and
Vietnam declared its intention to use the lessons learned from the
accident in building its nuclear power program.1 4 5
Nevertheless, many of these countries have added new reactors
since the Fukushima disaster, including China, Kazakhstan, South
Korea, Pakistan, and Russia. 146 Others are maintaining plans to
build up their programs, such as in Malaysia and Indonesia,1 4 7 the
United Arab Emirates,1 4 8 and Brazil.14 9 In fact, as of July 2015, sixtyseven reactors were under construction globally, with twenty-four in
China, six in India, nine in Russia, three in the United Arab
Emirates, one in Brazil, and four in South Korea.150 In other words,
nearly two-thirds of the reactors under construction are located in
China, India, and Russia, with one-third in China alone-arguably
making it the most prominent exemplar of countries in this category
of expanding nuclear use post-Fukushima.1 5 1
Indeed, China has the most ambitious nuclear power plan in the
world15 2 and, as of 2013, had already overtaken Germany to become

140.
MYCLE SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 97, at 18.
141.
Keith B. Richburg, China Suspends All New Nuclear Plants, Orders Safety
Reviews; U.S. Plans Unchanged, WASH. POST 1 (March 16, 2011), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-suspends-all-new-nuclear-plants-orders-safetyreview/2011/03/16/ABZHU1d.story.html [http://perma.cclMD4X-DPNA] (archived Sept.
5, 2015); Nuclear Power in China, supra note 73; MYCLE SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note
97, at 18.
142.
Hayashi & Hughes, supra note 69, at 109; see also RAJYA SABHA, GOv'T OF
INDIA DEP'T OF ATOMIC ENERGY EXPERIENCE FROM FUKUSHIMA DISASTER (Nov. 24,
11
1.pdf [http://perma.cc/
2011), available at http://dae.nic.in/writereaddatarsus317-241
R6SM-6W8D] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
143.
SABHA, supranote 142; MYCLE SCHNEIDER ET AL., supranote 97, at 42.
144.
SCHNEIDER ET AL., supranote 97, at 47.
145.
Id. at 44.
Nian & Chou, supra note 59, at 839.
146.
147.
See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 97, at 42-43 (citing Malaysia's plans to
continue with nuclear plant program despite increasing opposition).
148.
Id. at 44.
149.
Id. at 47.

150.

Nuclear Units Under Construction Worldwide, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST.,

http://www.nei.org/Knowledge-Center/Nuclear-Statistics/World-Statistics/NuclearUnits-Under-Construction-Worldwide (last updated July 2015) [http://perma.ce/4RT7RLJ9] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
151.
Id.

152.

See Stephen Chen, China Plans to be World Leader in Nuclear Power by

2020, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, (Sept. 14, 2014, 6:34 AM), http://www.scmp.com/
news/china/article/1591984/china-plans-be-world-leader-nuclear-power-2020?page=all
[https://perma.cc/AK5L-SH74?type=image] (archived Sept. 6, 2015); see also Yongxiang
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the world's fifth largest nuclear energy producer.1 53 The Fukushima
disaster transpired in the midst of a revolution in China's energy
system: in 2011, China became the world's largest energy
consumer, 15 4 accounting for 17 percent of world demand for energy,
with consumption only expected to continue rising to 22 percent of
world demand by 2035.155 At the same time, the Chinese government
is also attempting to dramatically reduce air pollution, cut reliance on
fossil fuels, prevent power shortages, 156 and reduce reliance on
imported energy sources.1 57 Add to this the nation's pledge to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by 45 percent by 2020, 158 and it is
immediately clear that China's energy system is truly one in flux. 59
China's reaction to Fukushima reflected the broader context of
the nation's energy landscape. Immediately after the disaster, on
March 16, 2011, China announced that it would temporarily suspend
its nuclear plant approval process while it conducted comprehensive
safety checks of all nuclear projects, drafted a new nuclear safety
plan, and adjusted the medium- and long-term nuclear development
plan. 160 An inspection group composed of the National Energy
Administration (NEA), the National Nuclear Safety Administration,
and the China Earthquake Administration completed this process for
operating plants in three months, and for facilities under construction
by October 2011.161 The inspection results found that while China's
Wang et al., Media Coverage and Government Policy of Nuclear Power in the People's
Republic of China, 77 PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 214, 214 (2014) (stating that
China has twenty eight nuclear power units under construction); InternationalEnergy
Statistics, supranote 62 (showing growth trend).
153 Schneider, supra note 62, at 14.
China, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.govfbeta/internationall
154.
analysis.cfm?iso=CHN (last updated May 14, 2015) [http://perma.ccXSM2-DVTA]
(archived Sept. 6, 2015).
155.
Clifford Krauss, In Global Forecast, China Looms Large as Energy User
and Maker of Green Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/11/10/business/global/l0oil.html (subscription required) [http://perma.ce/FPM7T3SH] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
156.
See Nuclear Power in China, supra note 73.
157.
Brian Spegele, China Mulls New Steps on Nuclear Energy, WALL ST. J.,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303506404577444173316508002 (last
updated June 4, 2012, 10:30 AM) (subscription required) [http://perma.cc/9U2N-7365]
(archived Sept. 6, 2015).
158.
See Nuclear Power in China, supra note 73; see also Kottasova, supra note
64.
159.
See generally Elspeth Thomson, Introduction to Special Issue: Energy
Issues in China's 12th Five Year Plan and Beyond, 73 ENERGY POL'Y 1 (2014); Joel B.
Eisen, The New Energy Geopolitics?: China, Renewable Energy, and the "Greentech
Race", 86 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 9 (2011).
160.
Y.C. Xu, The Struggle for Safe Nuclear Expansion in China, 73 ENERGY
POL'Y 21, 21, 26 (2014).
161.
Nuclear Power in China, supra note 73; see Du Juan, Nuclear Power to
Become
'Foundation' of
Country's
Electrical System,
CHINA
DAILY,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-12/07/content_14223281.htm
(last updated
Dec. 7, 2011) [http://perma.cc/H2CS-NDG3] (archived Sept. 6, 2015); see also Country
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plants met domestic and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
safety standards, some facilities lacked necessary accident prevention
and mitigation plans. 162 As a result, the State Council approved in
principle a new nuclear safety plan that required appropriate safety
improvements at all civilian nuclear facilities by 2015, thereby
affirming that China would continue to put safety and quality first
and would fully incorporate the IAEA safety standards into its own
safety standards. 163 In an attempt to improve the transparency of
nuclear regulation, the government then formally solicited public
comments on this nuclear safety plan. 164 Soon after, to further
enhance nuclear safety at Chinese plants, the NEA promulgated
technical specifications to be used in general renovations of plants
under operation and construction, which were issued in June 2012 in
the "General Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plant
Renovation
After
the
Fukushima
Accident
(For
Trial
Implementation)." 165

Despite these new specifications, China's nuclear program did
not resume until October 2012, when China's State Council debriefed
reports on the safety inspections, officially approved the "Twelfth Five
Year Plan and 2020 Vision for Nuclear Safety and Radioactive
Pollution Prevention, 2011-2020 Planning for Nuclear Power Safety,
and the amended the 2011-2020 Mid-long Term Development
Planning for Nuclear Power." 166 These plans called for improved
safety standards for nuclear expansion, including construction at a
controlled pace, limited approval of nuclear projects in coastal regions
to those that pass safety and environmental reviews, and no approval
of any projects in inland provinces from 2011-2015.167 As a result,
inland projects at three locations-Taohuajiang, Xianning, and
Pengze-that had been expected to start construction before 2015
were rescheduled. 168 Moreover, since approvals recommenced, China

Nuclear Power Profiles: China, IAEA (2014), https://cnpp.iaea.org/countryprofiles/
China/China.htm [https://perma.cc/GCM2-PQFU] (archived Sept. 6, 2015).
162.
Hui Zhang & Shangui Zhao, China Moves Cautiously Ahead on Nuclear
Energy, BULL.OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr. 22, 2013), at 2, http://thebulletin.org/
china-moves-cautiously-ahead-nuclear-energy [http://perma.cc/8XX3-DHFH] (archived

Sept. 6, 2015); see also Country Nuclear Power Profiles: China, supra note 161
(outlining China's nuclear safety measures post-Fukushima).
163.
See Zhang & Zhao, supra 162, at 2 (examining China's Medium- and Longterm Nuclear Power Development Plan); see also Nuclear Power in China, supra note
73.

164.

Nuclear Power in China, supranote 73.

165.

Id.

166.

Country Nuclear Power Profiles: China, supra note 161; see also Xu, supra

note 160, at 26.
167.
Xu, supra note 160, at 23-26; Zhang & Zhao, supra note 162.
168.
China Resumes New Reactor Approvals, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (Mar. 10,
2015), http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NN-China-resumes-new-reactor-approvals1003155.html [https://perma.cc/Q7Q8-ARFQ?type=source] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).

2015]

FUKUSHIMA'S SHADOW

1111

has only approved three new reactors as of April 2015,169 confirming
their controlled pace and limited approval of projects. However,
China continues to push forward, completing reactors that had
already been approved before Fukushima.
Ultimately, then, besides moderating its pace for approving new
reactors, China's overall plans have not changed significantly since
Fukushima. Prior to the accident, China's aim was to add 70-80
gigawatts (GWe) of nuclear power by 2020; however, in October 2012,
that plan was modified to 60 GWe by 2020.170 Then, in 2014, the NEA
announced it was "aiming for world leadership in nuclear technology,
with detailed plans to come in April 2015."171 Before the accident,
China was operating thirteen nuclear reactors, with thirty under
construction. 172 As of October 2015, China had twenty-eight nuclear
power reactors in operation and twenty-four under construction, with
plans to increase that number significantly by 2020.173
China's experience post-Fukushima is emblematic of the
approach that other countries in this category have followed. India,
like China, temporarily postponed its approval process to undertake
safety reviews of its existing plants. 174 However, it resumed
approvals in June 2012175 and has since begun construction on seven
reactors.17 6 Similarly, Russia reviewed the safety of its nuclear plants
after the accident,177 but maintains its intent to double its current
nuclear capacity by 2020. 178 Saudi Arabia also reiterated its
commitment to the acquisition and expansion of nuclear power after
the accident, 179 and put forward a plan to build sixteen new nuclear

169.
Id.; Brian Spegele, China Sends Nuclear-Industry Message with New
Reactor Approval, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 16, 2015, 7:25 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
chinarealtime/2015/04/16/china-sends-nuclear-industry-message-with-new-reactorapproval/ [http://perma.cc/9D5L-KALZI (archived Oct. 16, 2015).
170.
Nuclear Power in China, supranote 73.
Id.
171.
172.
Matsuo et al., supra note 106, at 87.
173.
INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA], China, People's Republic of, IAEA
PRIS,
http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current= CN
(last updated Oct.. 6, 2015) [http://perma.cc/JM57-QRB6] (archived Oct. 16, 2015);
Kottasova, supranote 64.
174.
Hayashi & Hughes, supra note 69, at 109.
175.

Id. See generally DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,

Experience from Fukushima Disaster (Nov. 24, 2011), available at http://dae.nic.in/
writereaddatarsus3l7_241111.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2015) [https://perma.cc/UD35EDXT] (archived Sept. 5, 2015).
176.
Matsuo et al., supranote 106, at 87.
See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 97, at 47 (noting the request "that the
177.
energy ministry, nuclear agency and environment ministry carry out an analysis of the
current condition of the atomic sector and an analysis of the plans for future
development").
178.
Hayashi & Hughes, supranote 69, at 109.
179.
Ahmad & Ramana, supra note 77, at 682.
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reactors by 2030.180 Other countries have expressed their interest in
building nuclear power plants despite Fukushima and intend to do so
despite public opposition. 181 Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance,
have indicated that they will proceed with their plans to build out
nuclear power facilities in their jurisdictions, 182 and the United Arab
Emirates dismissed concerns about the safety of nuclear power plants
and broke ground for the initial work at a proposed nuclear site in
Braka. 183 Thus, when the approach of these jurisdictions is
considered together with that of those who have chosen to maintain
their existing plants, it becomes quite clear: Fukushima may have
cast a shadow, clouding the future of nuclear power in some nations,
but in many others, the technology forges ahead nonetheless.

IV. SOME LIGHT: FUKUSHIMA AS A LENS INTO GLOBAL ENERGY POLICY
One might think that the shadow of Fukushima would transform
the nuclear industry, and energy policy with it. Instead, as the
diverse approaches nations have chosen shows, while Fukushima's
impact has been global, it appears not to have inalterably reshaped
the nuclear industry, much less nuclear energy policy. The standard
response in the short term was to pause, assess, and implement
additional safety measures; one would expect nothing less. But in the
long term, most countries have been largely unmoved, continuing to
pursue policies of nuclear utilization or expansion. 184 Only a few
nations, such as Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, turned hard
against nuclear power, and even for that group, one might say they
were predisposed to do' so. 185 Fukushima's shadow, then, while
certainly broad, appears to be just that-a penumbra, definitely felt
but only moderately influential and perhaps only in passing.
Nevertheless, countries' varying responses to Fukushima offer
important insight into the global energy system and the policies that
support it. If a tragedy of the scope and amplitude of Fukushima
cannot fundamentally alter the way the world approaches energy,
that says much about how countries address energy decision making.
Indeed, that nations varied so widely in their responses to
Fukushima itself exposes the very complexity of the energy system,
as well as the energy law and policy systems that govern it.

Matsuo et al., supra note 106, at 87.
180.
See SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 97, at 41-48.
181.
182.
Id. at 42-43.
183.
Id. at 45.
See generally Matsuo et al., supra note 106, at 87; Actions Taken by
184.
Regulatory Bodies and InternationalOrganisationsFollowing the Fukushirna Daiichi
Nuclear Accident, supranote 109.
185.
See supra Part III.A.
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Complexity theory,1 86 and particularly the idea of panarchy,18 7 would
suggest that nations would follow no single path in the wake of a
disaster like Fukushima, precisely because so many values and
interests are at stake. That, of course, is exactly what happened.
Different nations took different paths, based on their own
predilections, unique cultures, and assessments of energy tradeoffs.
Fukushima, however, is useful not just for spotlighting the
complexity of the energy, and energy law and policy, systems. Even
more concretely, the complexity of nations' responses to Fukushima
exposes three core tensions within energy policy worldwide.
Specifically, in designing their energy policies, countries are
inevitably forced to choose between markets and planning. Many
countries favor allowing markets to dictate the pace and type of their
energy development, with the idea that free markets reach more
economically efficient outcomes. But to the extent a country favors
any particular direction for its energy system, it inevitably will want
to use policy to shape how those markets function. This recognition
that markets may not achieve desired energy policies leads to two
other difficulties. Energy systems are massive, so they quickly
become path dependent, in part because they demand such heavy
capital investment. Thus, when government objectives change, or
technologies advance, quickly changing the shape of a nation's energy
system can be difficult. Likewise, because energy is so fundamental to
how modern nations function, energy policies inevitably promote

186.

For more on complexity theory generally, see, for example, NEIL F.

JOHNSON, TWO'S COMPANY, THREE IS COMPLEXITY (2007); MELANIE MITCHELL,
COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR (2009); JOHN H. MILLER & ScOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX
ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF SOCIAL LIFE

(2007).
187.

&

As J.B. Ruhl has put it:
Resilience theory does not posit that a system as complex as law is
entirely either a vase or a saucer; rather, it is more a set of
landscapes over which we find engineering and ecological resilience
strategies mixing in different blends to form topographies of various
contours depending on where in the system we look. Some
resilience theorists refer to this multiscalar complex of topographies
as a "panarchy."
J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal
Systems: With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1383
(2011). Clearly, different nations' approaches to nuclear power post-Fukushima exhibit
precisely this kind of "different blends" of engineering and policy strategies depending
on the context. For more on panarchy more generally, however, see, for example, C.S.
Holling et al., Sustainability and Panarchies, in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 63-102 (Lance H. Gunderson
C.S. Holling eds., 2002), and Ahjond S. Garmestani et al., Panarchy, Adaptive
Management and Governance: Policy Options for Building Resilience, 87 NEB. L. REV.
1036 (2009).
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conflicting values. 188 These
might include
multiple, often
industrialization, economic growth, social support, equity, and
environmental protection. How any given policy works out-or fails to
work out-the tension in these values can heavily influence the
composition of the nation's energy system.
The reactions countries had to the Fukushima disaster highlight
each of these tensions in global energy policy. Each policy tension,
moreover, deserves far more extensive treatment in its own right
than can be provided here. Nonetheless, to help begin that work, the
remainder of this Article briefly explores these tensions through the
lens of Fukushima. It then briefly examines the implications of the
tensions in the nuclear energy context.
A. Markets vs. Planning
A fundamental tension in energy policy is whether government
allows energy outcomes to be determined by markets or dictates those
outcomes via directives and planning.' 8 9 This tension is pervasive. In
the United States, for instance, a market approach has long applied
to oil sales, but that was not always the case.1 90 The story of U.S.
natural gas likewise is dominated by the twists and turns needed to
reach, and to react to, wellhead deregulation.191 And U.S. electricity
policy remains riven by this tension, with markets dominating
wholesale sales but states divided messily between those pursuing
retail choice and those not. 192 Law and policy thus grapple ceaselessly
with how to shape markets, and how to ensure they perform
93
properly.1

188.

See, e.g., Andrew Long,

Complexity in Global Energy-Environment

Governance, 15 MINN. J.L. Scl. & TECH. 1055 (2014); Hari M. Osofsky, Complex Value
Choices at the Environment-Energy Interface, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 261
(2014). For an excellent summary, see Robin Kundis Craig, Learning to Think About

Complex Environmental Systems in Environmental and Natural Resource Law and
Legal Scholarship:A Twenty- Year Retrospective, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2013).
189.
Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets

and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1339, 1341 (1993).
See FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
190.
CASES AND MATERIALS 18-22 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the United States' history of
regulation in the energy industry).
LINCOLN L. DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 629-51 (2014).
191.
192.
See id. at 397-435.

193.

David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93

CORNELL L. REV. 765, 776 (2008); see also Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The
Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 68 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2584619 [http://perma.cc/MDZ5-9UMK] (archived Sept. 5,
2015) (examining how the United States' piecemeal regulatory approach, which
includes "both increasing reliance on markets and competition in public utility
regulation, and stricter environmental regulation of energy production facilities," has
led to numerous dysfunctions).

2015]

FUKUSHIMA'S SHADOW

1115

Nuclear power exhibits the same tension, some would say in
spades. The resource would not have been available for civilian
purposes but for massive U.S. government research and development
funding, 194 followed by policies aimed at promoting it, including
limited liability provisions such as the Price-Anderson Act.195 Still,
when the industry backed off the rapid expansion of its early years, it
assigned much blame to unpredictable, iterative government safety
regulation, which drove up costs.

196

Thus, as in other areas of energy

policy, the push-pull tension of markets and central planning
emerged in nuclear energy just as it pervaded other energy sectors.
Fukushima, without question, highlighted the tension. Countries
like China and India that chose to continue promoting nuclear power
serve as reminders that, whether it is in the name of energy security
or supply abundance or something else, governments often pick
winners.' 9 7 At the same time, nations like Germany that announced
their abdication of atomic power in the name of safety and
environmental protection likewise showed that governments are not
hesitant to put a policy thumb on the market scale-if in a much
different direction than China or India-when it comes to energy. 9 8
Indeed, in bidding farewell to nuclear power, the German
Energiewende and its dominant tool of the Erneuerbare-EnergienGesetz (EEG, or Renewable Energy Sources Act) use a kind of marketbased regulation to encourage incumbent companies and especially
new entrants to produce electricity from the government's new
winner of renewable resources. 199
Such decisions also demonstrate the deep interconnectedness of
our energy systems. Germany may turn to renewables to replace its
nuclear power, but renewables bring their own demands, including
substantial transmission upgrades, intensive legal and policy
attention, and, perhaps, capacity markets.2 00 Thus, the tradeoff of one
energy source for another cannot be described as simply choosing one
kind of "cleaner" or "safer" technology over another. Rather, any
movement in one direction necessarily compels other shifts and
evolutions in the broader energy system. Even from an environmental
perspective, and particularly with respect to climate effects, any

194.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 194 (1983).
195.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2039, 2210.
196.
See Richard Goldsmith, Regulatory Reform and the Revival of Nuclear
Power, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159, 182-83 (1991).
197.
See supraPart III.C.
198.
See supraPart III.A.
199.
Id.
200.
See generally Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-In Tariffs in
Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937 (2014) (examining the dilemmas presented by feed-in
tariffs in Germany, Spain, and South Korea).
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decision to abandon nuclear power carries heavy consequences with
it. 2 0 1

Fukushima, then, shines a bright light on the hard questions
that the markets-versus-planning tension raises. When should
governments intervene in energy decision making? How should they
intervene? How should governments assess energy tradeoffs? How
should different kinds of risks be weighed? Under what conditions
should governments be willing to regulate retroactively, 202 especially
since retroactivity can both undermine efficacy and increase
compliance cost? 203 In nuclear power as well as in energy generally,
these dilemmas are not just prevalent, but deep.
B. Path Dependence vs. Resilience
Cataclysm for electrical engineers is the lights going off. Why?
The very goal of the system is reliability-power as needed, when
needed, all the time. The aim is not electricity's alone. A persistent
objective of energy policy is security: making sure enough supply is
available whenever needed. 204 Governments go to great lengths to
achieve this aim, and those efforts in turn create a second important
tension in energy policy also highlighted by Fukushima: limiting path
dependence while also ensuring system resilience.
It is in vogue today to question whether disruptive innovation
will foment an electric utility "death spiral." 205 This tension, of
course, has long been a part of energy law and policy, dating back at
least to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Market Street Railway
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of California206 and persisting to this day.
One side of the tension is the risk of path dependence. Energy
law and policy have often been criticized as preferencing large,

201.
See Stephen J. Dubner, What Happens Next as the World Turns Away
From Nuclear Power? A Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS (June 21, 2011, 11:31
AM), http://freakonomics.com/2011/06/21/what-happens-next-as-the-world-turns-awayfrom-nuclear-power-a-freakonomics-quorum/ [https://perma.cc/G2Y8-BH6A] (archived
Sept. 6, 2015).
202.
Emily Hammond, Nuclear Power, Risk and Retroactivity, 48 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1059 (2015).
203.
On values important to energy investors and energy transformation, see
generally, for example, Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable
Energy, 42 ENvTL. L. 681 (2012); Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables
Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 901 (2011).
204.
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY POLICY HIGHLIGHTS 11 (2013), available at
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EnergyPolicy-Highlights
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incumbent, institutional actors. 207 In the United States, for example,
the electricity system has historically favored large centralized power
plants that deliver electricity over three large grid systems, rather
than more localized, "distributed generation" systems. This
preference, in turn, has entrenched institutions related to coal,
natural gas, and nuclear energy. Thus, the prevalence of these
institutions makes transforming the energy system quite hard to do.
This "dominant" energy paradigm then doubles down on itself
because a capital investment as large as a nuclear reactor is hard to
walk away from, particularly when the plan was to recoup the
investment over several decades. Amory Lovins thus famously
referred to the "hard path" of energy, and nuclear power was his
prototypical example. 208 Nuclear power, of course, is but one example.
The problem is pervasive in energy systems generally, which
historically have been very capital intensive. Thus, whether the
objective is to reduce emissions that cause acid rain, to limit land
consumption for renewables, or to move away from coal for climate
change reasons, 209 the fact remains that in energy, as in life,
abandoning massive sunk costs is no easy task.
The other side of this tension is resilience. For many reasons,
scholars increasingly look to the idea of resilience, rather than
sustainability, to talk about the staying power of systems. 210 Nuclear
power, of course,
has many sustainability benefits-most
prominently, its limited greenhouse gas emissions as well as its much
lighter impact on air quality than natural gas and especially coal. 211
One might note that nuclear power provides our energy system with a
remarkable amount of resilience as well. No other conventional
energy source has produced so much electricity with such a record of
safety. Further, the manner in which it produces electricity is
noteworthy, as no new plants were built in the United States for
decades, but the fleet substantially increased its production anyway
through upgrades and operational optimization. 212 If adaptability is a
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hallmark of resilience, this trend alone argues that nuclear power,
despite the massive size of its plants and the immense capital costs
the technology demands, is indeed adaptable when needed.
Again, nations' reactions to the Fukushima disaster make this
tension apparent. On one hand, nations that chose to keep the status
quo, like France and the United States, might be criticized as making
that decision out of reluctance to abandon longstanding investments:
that is, the effect of sunk costs, or path dependence. On the other
hand, nations that chose to build more nuclear plants, like China,
India, and South Korea, may serve as a testament to the technology's
reliability and durability: even in the wake of a tragedy, they trust
that if their energy systems need to adapt further, they can.
Certainly, nations that have shifted their bet from atomic energy to
renewables, like Germany, believe that Lovins' soft path is the more
resilient one in the long term-more agile, nimble, and adaptable.
But the fact that any nation's policy must make this call, and that
every nation was faced with reevaluating this question postFukushima, only underscores its centrality in global energy policy.
C. Values vs. Values
It is of course true that laws often have multiple objectivescriminal law, for instance, aims to both punish and deter-but
perhaps no field is as laden with as many values as is energy law and
policy. 2 13 This, then, is the third fundamental tension. Energy policies
espouse many values, often many at once. Discerning which value is
in question is difficult enough; measuring tradeoffs among competing
values is far harder still.
Values in energy policy sometimes are plain. For example,
Professor Tomain has identified several values of traditional U.S.
energy policy: abundance of supply, reliability of supply, low price,
and governance via competition and state-federal oversight. 214
Increasingly, environmental protection (or at least mitigation of
environmental harms) also is a value of energy policy 2 15-as are
efficiency, equity, and, to some degree, democracy. Energy
"independence" is often held out as a core value of U.S. energy policy,
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Integration of Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369
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whatever "energy independence" means, if it means anything at
all.

2 16

One problem, however, is that sometimes it is not clear which
value a given energy law or policy seeks to promote. A renewable
portfolio standard, for instance, would seem to be all about greening
the electricity supply, but jurisdictions often cite the idea of job
creation in support of these laws' passage. 217 Another difficulty is that
energy policy values can conflict. Part I of the Federal Power Act,
which regulates hydroelectricity, specifically identifies recreation and
ecological concerns as considerations in its licensing process, but its
original core aim is obviously to augment power supplies. 218 Finally,
it is often* difficult to quantify or measure the value that is being
promoted in any given energy policy-and, sometimes, different
values that a policy advances are not seen, or are ignored. Congress
might pass a law that can help shore up reliability in the electricity
grid, but the way the law ultimately is implemented preferences
traditional values about who governs over other aims,2 19 perhaps in
part because the value of reliability is invisible on a day-to-day basis.
As with the other tensions, Fukushima exposed the inherent
clash of values in energy policy. In choosing whether to continue with
nuclear energy production, different nations expressed different
values in their energy policies. Arguably, Germany's choice was to
preference risk reduction over everything (or to promote energy
democracy through renewable resources), while the United States'
was primarily to keep reactors safe and prices down, and China's can
be chalked up to a desire to promote both energy access and economic
expansion. 220 In each of these cases, multiple values are or could be at
play.
That is the point. In terms of its end product, nuclear power does
the same thing all other generation sources do. It produces electricity.
"Electrons can't be colored," electrical engineers are fond of saying,
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meaning that electricity cannot be traced once it is injected into the
grid. 22 1 But the same thing is true from a consumption perspective.
One kilowatt-hour of electricity from a nuclear plant is perfectly
fungible with one kilowatt-hour from a coal-fired or photovoltaic
plant; they all do the same amount of work. The problem is that a
focus on energy systems' end products can obfuscate the other values
the systems advance. 222 For example, nuclear power plants and coalfired plants differ in both their actual externalities (e.g., air pollution
or water consumption or waste storage and treatment) and in the
short- and long-term risks they impose. To the extent that the same
focus on end products rather than overall context occurs in policy, a
similar distortion can manifest in how we think about energy. In
choosing to democratize its energy system post-Fukushima, for
instance, Germany may have foregone key values (such as baseload
stability and no greenhouse gas emissions) that nuclear power can
promote-just as Japan, until March 11, masked or ignored the
technology's risk to human health and the environment for the sake
of a stable, abundant, made-at-home electricity supply.
D. Implications:Nuclear Energy Post-Fukushima
The tensions of energy policy are not easily resolved, and
arguably are not even resolvable. Energy is so critical to the very way
in which modern society functions, it is inevitable that conflicts will
arise over how it should be used, and over the ways in which policy
seeks to promote and shape its use. For modern nations, particularly
industrialized nations, energy is lifeblood. The energy policy that is
used to ensure the availability, and delivery, of this resource, then,
also is fundamental.
At the same time, the lifeblood of energy carries with it many
risks. These risks are manifold, and are not just environmental but
economic and social as well. The immediate loss of an energy source
has the potential to cast just as many ripples throughout a nation's
economy as might an energy disaster through the eco- and biological
systems on which societies rely.
Fukushima demonstrated this in every way. The disaster's
effects on Japan have been heavily economic and social as well as
environmental. The tens of thousands who have been relocated from
the prefecture may have avoided long-term radiation impacts from
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the meltdowns, but they feel the disaster's aftereffects on a daily
basis.
Moreover, the shadow that Fukushima has cast on global energy
policy is undeniably significant. This observation is plain for
countries that chose to abandon nuclear power in Fukushima's wake,
but it is equally clear, if less obvious, for those that decided to
maintain or even expand use of nuclear energy following the disaster.
Even those jurisdictions paused, reassessed, and recalibrated their
policies to adjust to the Fukushima disaster. Fukushima, then, also
made clear the global interconnectedness of energy systems and
energy policy systems. The immediate environmental effects of the
disaster radiated through the Japanese countryside, but the
aftershocks of this one facility's demise spread across the globe.
Inevitably, every energy industry operates in a policy context
that is inherently elastic, murky, and evolutionary. The very nature
of energy policy, with its conflicting values and multiple tensions,
makes this the case. When a government chooses to reshape a policy
in one way, it by definition influences the overall shape and
composition of the policy in other ways as well. That is, the energy
system, and the energy law and policy systems that govern it, are
intricately complex. They are, moreover, interlinked and interrelated.
As complexity theory would suggest, a change in one part of one of
these systems inevitably will influence the others-and how those
changes play out should be expected to differ from one context to
another. 223 Thus, for example, when technology changes, or new ones
emerge, or the costs or risks of those already in use are made clear,
policies likewise have to adapt. Policymakers are responsible for this
uneasy task, a task that requires balancing multiple factors,
interests, objectives, and values. Disasters only make the calculus
more complex-both for the regulators and the regulated.
In Fukushima's shadow, the nuclear industry faces this reality
directly. Perhaps the specific reaction of any given nation to this
disaster could not be predicted, but the overall breadth of countries'
reactions might, in retrospect, be hardly surprising. This is what
complexity theory would predict. In systems as complex as energy
and energy policy, panarchy-as manifested in the idea that
responses will vary depending on their context, including space, time,
and socio-political culture-reigns. 224 It certainly did postFukushima. Not one but three responsive paths emerged, and the
details of how different nations followed those paths varied from one
jurisdiction to the next.
Moreover, the global response to Fukushima also highlighted
core tensions within energy policy more broadly and nuclear energy
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policy more specifically-tensions that cross borders and that are not
bound by technology type. The fact that some countries chose to
abdicate nuclear power, or stop exploring its possible use, reflects the
need to use regulation to influence markets if an energy policy aims
for a specific outcome or direction. It also may highlight the
preference of many policymakers for market outcomes; nuclear
power, indeed, often is criticized as possible only with heavy
governmental support. Likewise, the fact that many nations chose to
either continue to use, or even to expand, their nuclear energy use
after a disaster as severe as Fukushima shows the heavy influence of
path dependence on energy policy. Once a nation becomes reliant on
any resource, switching is not simple. Finally, Fukushima exposed a
wide variety of conflicting values embedded within energy policy,
often at the same time, whether that is Germany's emphasis on
energy democracy and participation, the United States' strong desire
for cheap prices and reliable supplies, or China's exponential energy
demands for industrial growth.
The nuclear energy industry, of course, arguably rests on shakier
ground post-Fukushima than it did before the disaster. Gone are the
days when commentators, policymakers, and others trumpeted the
impending nuclear renaissance. At the same time, nuclear power
appears on the rebound. Reactors are being added to the global fleet,
it remains a key resource in some of the world's most influential
nations, and the need for climate change mitigation continues to
present a possible opportunity for the industry's growth. Overall, the
policies adopted by nations in response to the Fukushima disaster
also reflect these realities, even if a minority of nations has stricken
nuclear energy from their electricity policy portfolios. As nuclear
power approaches its sixth decade of use, then, it appears to have
earned a reliable toehold in the global energy and energy policy
systems-even in the aftermath of Fukushima Daiichi, or at least
until another disaster of its magnitude occurs.

V. CONCLUSION

Disasters such as Fukushima cannot be overlooked, or
underestimated. Undeniably, they call not just for humanitarian aid
but also legal response, and legal structures that support restitution
of damaged areas and the people in them. What the reaction to
Fukushima shows, however, is that how legal and policy systems
change in response to disasters cannot necessarily be expected to be
uniform. Just as disasters are complex, so too are the legal,
industrial, and policy systems that allow for them to occur in the first
instance-and that respond once they take place. Such systems are
more like living organisms than raw materials ready for external
manipulation: they adapt and evolve, and seek to protect their own
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interests. For systems as complex as energy and energy policy, which
reflect many values and promote just as many goals, a single disaster
certainly may have influence, but is unlikely to effect a global sea
change by itself. Even where the shadow cast is wide and dark, light
may come again, once the disaster finally ends.

